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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND ITS REFORM
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW.
A.

America the Vulnerable.
As Jonathan Raban writes in a 2005 essay in the New York Review of

Books:
In its present form, the [American] War on Terror is a crippling,
expensive, meagerly productive effort to locate, catch, and kill bad guys
around the globe. Its successes are hardly less random, or more
effective in the long-term, than those that might be achieved by a
platoon of men armed with flyswatters entering a slaughterhouse whose
refrigeration has been off for a week.1
Sobering facts support Raban’s flyswatters-in-a-slaughterhouse metaphor.
Stephen Flynn—a former Coast Guard commander and director of global issues on the
National Security Council staff under President Clinton—has written an entire book,
published in 2004, on the subject: America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is
Failing to Protect Us From Terrorism.2 Flynn argues that “[p]aradoxically, the United
States has no rival when it comes to projecting its military, economic, and cultural
power around the world”, yet “we are practically defenseless at home.”3 In sobering
tones—linking our national unpreparedness for 9/11 to our homeland security at
present—Flynn summarizes our current state of national vulnerability to terrorism in
an extract worthy of complete quotation:
If September 11, 2001, was a wake-up call, clearly America has fallen
back asleep. Our return to complacency could not be more foolhardy.
The 9/11 attacks were not aberration. The same forces that helped to
produce the horror that befell the nation on that day continue to gather
1

strength. Yet we appear to be unwilling to do what must be done to
make our society less of a target. Instead, we are sailing into a national
security version of the Perfect Storm.
Homeland security has entered our post-9/11 lexicon, but homeland
insecurity remains the abiding reality. With the exception of airports,
much of what is critical to our way of life remains unprotected.
***
From water and food supplies; refineries, energy grids, and pipelines;
bridges, tunnels, trains, trucks and cargo containers; to the cyber
backbone that underpins the information age in which we live, the
measures we have been cobbling together are hardly fit to deter
amateur thieves, vandals, and hackers, never mind determined
terrorists. Worse still, small improvements are often oversold as giant
steps forward, lowering the guard of average citizens as they carry on
their daily routine with an unwarranted sense of confidence.4
In the American constitutional system, of course, matters of foreign policy
and national security are delegated by the People principally to the President and
executive agencies under his purview—like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the armed forces of the United States.5
The Congress, however, has from the founding days of the Republic exercised “[a]ll
legislative powers”—and related specific powers—forming a tradition of vigorous
oversight of executive branch activities, in general, and of foreign policy oversight
and national security policy oversight, in particular.6 Yet, how has Congress
performed its oversight responsibilities in the wake of 9/11? And, how is it equipped
to handle oversight of national counterterrorism policy and its implementation in the
remainder of the first decade of the twenty-first century? Trying to provide some
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tentative answers to the aforementioned two questions will be the overarching
purposes of this Article.
B.

Congressional Oversight of 9/11 and its Failure.
Just when the Nation needed adroit and resolute oversight of the

causes and meaning of 9/11, the United States Congress botched the job. Bigtime.
Although the Congress went through the motions of overseeing how and why
the executive branch—through such agencies as the CIA and FBI—neglected to
anticipate and prevent the attack on America on September 11, 2001, for reasons
which I seek to explain in this Article, the congressional exercise was a charade, and
the publication of its two and one-half inch thick, royal blue-covered report entitled
Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter Joint Inquiry Report or JIR)7 a dismal
failure.
As I will demonstrate, the 9/11 oversight failure of Congress was due to a
deficiency of institutional competence in matching and reigning in the executive
branch’s effort to stonewall and obfuscate. While Congress tried to save face for its
oversight failure by acquiescing to the creation of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”)8, this maneuver
was not constitutionally contemplated congressional oversight but congressional
abdication to executive branch manipulation. The central thesis of my Article, then,
is that Congress must resuscitate its institutional competence for overseeing
3

American counterterrorism policy and its implementation. As I will explain, Congress
can accomplished renewed competence for oversight of national counterterrorism
through three specific actions: (1) consolidating intelligence functions, (2) fostering
intelligence expertise among its members, and (3) experimenting with more
decentralized and indirect forms of intervention with Executive branch
counterterrorism agencies. Yet, since what is past is prologue to purposeful reform,
a substantial part of my Article is devoted to unpacking and analyzing what Congress
did and did not do leading up to its issuance of the Joint Inquiry Report. Indeed, the
meaning of the Joint Inquiry Report can best be understood as multi-flawed legal
process. Indeed, one of the purposes of this Article is to analyze the Joint Inquiry
Report from three process perspectives: (1) the process of congressional oversight of
executive intelligence gathering activities in order to interpret the meaning of the
terrorist attacks of 9/11; (2) the attempt to interpret the process failures of
America’s intelligence agencies leading up to 9/11, and (3) the attempt to
recommend new government processes of national intelligence and security.
The remainder of the Article is divided into five parts. Part II describes the
origins, purposes and structure of the JIR—an undertaking by two permanent
committees of Congress, one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate.9 Part III discusses and interprets the findings and conclusions of the Joint
Inquiry Report10. Part IV examines the recommendations contained in the
congressional document.11 Part V focuses on the additional views (in the nature of
4

dissenting and concurring opinions) of members of the Joint Inquiry.12 Part VI
discusses Congress’ constitutional responsibility for vigorous oversight of the
executive branch, the lost art of congressional oversight, and some ideas for
improving oversight of counterterrorism.13
II.

THE ORIGINS, PURPOSES AND STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT INQUIRY
A.

Origins and Purposes.

In the words of the Joint Inquiry Report, “[i]n February 2002 the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence agreed to conduct a joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated against
our nation on September 11, 2001.”14 According to the JIR, “[r]eflecting the
magnitude of the events of that day, the Committees’ decision was unprecedented in
Congressional history: for the first time, two permanent committees, one from the
House and one from the Senate, would join together to conduct a single, unified
inquiry.”15 The three key purposes of the Joint Inquiry were to: (1) “conduct a
factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have known prior
to September 11, 2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the United
States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist attacks
against the United States and its interests”;16 (2) “identify and examine any
systematic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning
of or preventing these attacks in advance;17 and (3) “make recommendations to
5

improve the Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future
international terrorist attacks.”18
The Joint Inquiry Report highlights the congressional oversight process which
was pursued (in terms of documents considered, witnesses interrogated, and the like)
to create a deceptive impression of thoroughness and completeness. In this regard,
the JIR states:
During the course of this Inquiry, these Committees have held nine
public hearings as well as thirteen closed sessions in which classified
information has been considered. In addition, the Joint Inquiry Staff has
reviewed almost 500,000 pages of relevant documents from the
Intelligence Community agencies and other sources, of which about
100,000 pages have been selected for incorporation into the Joint
Inquiry’s records. The Staff also conducted approximately 300
interviews and has participated in numerous briefings and panel
discussions, that have involved almost 600 individuals from the
Intelligence Community agencies, other U.S. Government organizations,
state and local entities, and representatives of the private sector and
foreign governments.19
B.

The Structure of the Joint Inquiry Report.
The principal JIR consists of 435 pages (in addition to cover letters20, a

foreword21, a summary table of contents22, a detailed table of contents,23
committee membership and staff rosters24, nine separate pages of “[a]bridged
[f]indings [a]nd [c]onclusions”25 incorporated into the document, as well as a 17 page
errata set of recommendations).26
Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001 consists of nine
principal headings:
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I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

The Plot Unfolds for the Attacks of September 11, 2001.27
Pentagon Flight Hijackers Khalid al-Muhdhar, Nawaf al-Hazami and Salim
al-Hazmi.28
NASA Communication Intercepts Related to Khalid al-Midhar, Nawaf and
Salim al-Hazmi.29
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar Had Numerous Contacts With an
Active FBI Informant.30
Associates of the September 11 Terrorists in the United States.31
Germany-Investigation of the Hamburg Cell.32
The Hijackers’ Visas.33
The Rising Threat and Context of the September 11 attacks.34
The Development of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Before September
11.35

Part Three—Topics—The Attacks of September 11, 2001 consists of fourteen
principal headings:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.

Counterrorism Resources.36
Foreign Liason.37
Covert Action and Military Operation Against Bin Ladin.38
Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding.39
Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM): The Mastermind of September 11.40
The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Before September 11.41
The Phonemix Electronic Communication (EC).42
Strategic Analyses.43
Views of Outside Experts on the Intelligence Community.44
Information Sharing.45
Technology Gaps.46
Technical Collection of Terrorist Communicators.47
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection.48
Summary of Joint Inquiry Review of Anthrax Attacks.49

The final part of the JIR in chief, Part Four—Finding, Discussion and Narrative
Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters, is, perhaps, the most
remarkable part of the Joint Inquiry Report. The simple reason for its remarkability
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is that, with the exception of a bracketed finding and bracketed discussion
(indicating the alternative language of the original JIR language cleared by the
Intelligence Community)50, virtually the entire 27 pages of this part are deleted!
Following the JIR in chief is a “Glossary of Terms and Acronyms”51, a table of
“Key Names”52, a table of “September 11, 2001 Hijackers”53, “Additional Views of
Members of the Joint Inquiry”54, and a number of appendices attached at the end of
the JIR.55
III.

THE JIRs FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Joint Inquiry Report contains five key factual findings and conclusions

about the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on September 11, sixteen
“systemic findings” and conclusions about the American Intelligence Community’s
deficient counterterrorist efforts before September 11th, and four “related findings”
and conclusions involving broader policy questions beyond the American Intelligence
Community. The discussion that follows attempts to deconstruct this “bureaucratspeak” and to reconceptualize these twenty-five congressional oversight findings and
conclusions into nine generic process failures of the American Intelligence
Community. These nine process failures are as follows: (a) the forest versus the trees
problem; (b) the right hand versus the left hand problem; (c) the Chicken Little
problem; (d) the “who’s on first” problem; (e) the show me the money problem; (f)
the dueling banjoes problem; (g) the through the glass dark problem; (h) the good
cop/bad cop problem and (i) the Catch-22 problem. As will be discussed in greater
8

detail, below, these nine generic process failures of the American Intelligence
Community are interrelated and intergovernmental (horizontal as well as vertical) in
nature.
A.

The Forest from the Trees Problem.

The bulk of the factual findings and conclusions of the JIR can be better
understood as a problem of perspective: while the American Intelligence Community
was obsessed with gathering discrete details, the process of intelligence lacked a
strategic capability to put individual pieces of the terrorism puzzle into a coherent
and holistic picture. Thus, the factual findings concerning intelligence on the threats
posed by Osama Bin Ladin56, the spring and summer of 2001 information on Al
Qaeda57, 1998-2001 intelligence58, aircrafts as weapons data59, and “collective
significance” myopia60 essentially describe a failure of the American Intelligence
Community to appreciate the “forest” that its “trees” of intelligence suggested.
Moreover, two of the four “related findings” in the Joint Inquiry Report are in the
nature of a forest from the trees process failure of the American Intelligence
Community: the failure of the U.S. Government to “undertake a comprehensive effort
to implement defensive measures in the United States,” despite intelligence
information spanning the time of “1998 through the summer of 2001 indicating that
Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network intended to strike inside the United States”61,
and the failure of the U.S. Government to benefit from “an alert, mobilized and
committed American public” stemming from a lack of notice “to alert the American
9

public to the reality and gravity of the threat” of terrorist attacks before September
11, 2001.62 Indeed, the general conclusion to the JIR factual findings consists of a
lamentation over perspective failure before 9/11:
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to
capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available
information that appears relevant to the events of September 11. As a
result, the Community missed opportunities to disrupt the September
11th plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least
try to unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work
within the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened state of
alert and thus harden the homeland against attack.
No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections
been drawn between these disparate pieces of information. We will
never definitively know to what extent the Community would have been
able and willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may have
emerged. The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for
a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range
of information that could have greatly enhanced the chances of
uncovering and preventing Osama Bin Ladin’s plan to attack these
United States on September 11, 2001.63
Importantly, the first systematic finding also speaks of the fundamental failure
of the American Intelligence Community to perceive the forest from the trees, noting
that “[p]rior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized
nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global
terrorists focused on targets within the domestic Untied States” because of “[s]erious
gaps [that] existed between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S.
domestic intelligence capabilities” stemming from “inadequate attention” by the CIA
“to the potential for a domestic attack” and the inability of the FBI “to identify and
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monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international
terrorist groups operating in the United States.”64
B.

The Right Hand vs. the Left Hand Problem.

A central feature of the factual findings and conclusions of the Joint Inquiry
Report is professed amazement by Congress at the two distinct cultures of the CIA, on
the one hand, and the FBI, on the other hand. As one of the JIR factual findings
expresses the problem, the right hand of the American Intelligence Community did
not know what the left hand was up to in dealing with known terrorists in the United
States before September 11:
[Two key hijackers had] numerous contacts with a long time FBI
counterterrorism informant in California and … a third future hijacker …
apparently had more limited contact with the informant. In mid-tolate-2000, the CIA already had information indicating that [two of the
hijackers] had [been in the United States] but the two had not been
watchlisted and information suggesting that two suspected terrorists
could well be in the United States had not yet been given to the FBI.
The San Diego FBI field office that handled the informant in question,
did not receive that information [from the CIA] or any of the other
intelligence information pertaining to [two terrorists in the country]
prior to September 11, 2001. As a result, the FBI missed the opportunity
to task a uniquely well-positioned informant—who denies having any
advance knowledge of the plot—to collect information about the
hijackers and their plans within the United States.65
One systemic finding of the Joint Inquiry Report speaks of the two cultures
divide between the CIA and the FBI and the attendant lack of information sharing
between these agencies before September 11.66 A related right hand/left hand
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systemic finding addresses the divide between the American Intelligence Community
versus the non-Intelligence Community.67
C.

The Chicken Little Problem.

The well-known children’s story about Chicken Little is a cautionary tale about
the dangers of over-reaction.68 The deeper social problem, however, illustrated by
the Chicken Little parable, is when real dangers are underappreciated and underdeterred. Part of this problem might stem from past exaggerations. Part of the
problem, in the alternative, might arise from too many tasks and not enough
resources. In either case, it is apparent that the congressional investigation
discerned a kind of problem where FBI superiors underappreciated real dangers of
domestic terrorist attacks from domestically trained terrorist-pilots. According to an
eerie JIR factual finding:
On July 10, 2001, an FBI Phoenix field office agent sent an “Electronic
Communication” to 4 individuals in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit
(RFU) and two people in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI
headquarters, and to two agents on International Terrorist squads in the
New York Field office. In the communication, the agent expressed his
concerns, based on his first-hand knowledge, that there was a
coordinated effort underway by Bin Ladin to send students to the United
States for civil aviation-related training. He noted that there was an
“inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” in this type
of training in Arizona and expressed his suspicion that this was an effort
to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct
future terrorist activity. The Phoenix [electronic communication]
requested that FBI Headquarters consider implementing four
recommendations:
•
•

accumulate a list of civil aviation university/colleges
around the country;
establish liaison with these schools;
12

•
•

discuss the theories contained in the Phoenix [electronic
communication] with the Intelligence Community; and
consider seeking authority to obtain visa information
concerning individuals seeking to attend flight schools.

However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action
requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11, 2001. The
communication generated little or no interest at either FBI
Headquarters or the FBI’s New York field office.69
D.

The “Who’s On First?” Problem.

While the late comedic team of Abbott and Costello achieved regular laughs in
performing their play on words involving different baseball runners with pronouns for
names70, one way of interpreting their routine is as a moral tale of the organizational
risks of widespread incompetence. Numerous findings of the Joint Inquiry Report
portray an incompetent American Intelligence Community (an oxymoron of sorts) in
disarray. In the first place, three JIR factual sub-findings relate to specific instances
of organizational incompetence leading up to September 11. One sub-finding
addresses the legal mistake of FBI officials investigating suspected confederates in
the 9/11 hijackings71; another sub-finding focuses on the maladroit manner American
officials handled the mastermind of the September 11 attacks while he was awaiting
a trial for an earlier act of terrorism72; and a third sub-finding deals with the bungling
by NSA, the National Security Agency, in neglecting to translate and disseminate
intercepted communications that indicated that the threat of imminent terrorist
attacks in September of 2001.73
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In the second place, six systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry Report are
properly categorized as “who’s on first?” problems. First, systemic finding 2 states:
Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S. Government as a whole
nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist
strategy for combating the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin.
Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either
unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community
resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United
States.74
Interestingly, the JIR discussion supporting this systemic finding notes that
“[t]he Intelligence Community is a large distributed organism. It encompasses 14
agencies and tens of thousands of employees” and “[t]he number of people employed
exclusively in the effort against Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda was relatively
small.”75 Yet, revealingly, Congress found that “these people were operating in
geographically dispersed locations, often not connected by secure information
technologies, and within established bureaucracies that were not culturally or
organizationally attuned to one another’s requirements,” while “[m]any of them had
limited experience against the target and did not know one another”; but, “[t]o
achieve success in such an environment, leadership is a critical factor” and “the
Intelligence Community’s structure made leadership difficult.”76 Moreover, in a
searing indictment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Joint Inquiry
Report discussion concludes that the record “indicates that the DCI did not marshal
resources effectively even within CIA against the threat posed by al-Qa’ida” and
“[d]espite the DCI’s declaration to CIA officials that the Agency was at war with Bin
14

Ladin … the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center needed additional personnel prior to
September 11, and the lack of resources had a substantial impact on its ability to
detect and monitor al-Qa’ida’s activities.”77
Second, systematic finding 5 at its heart, rails against the rampant
incompetence of the American Intelligence officials, stating:
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s understanding of al
Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality,
particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were
not always used effectively because of the perception in some quarters
of the Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency
counterterrorism missions than were operations/personnel. The quality
of counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many analysts were
inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to
critical information. As a result, there was a dearth of creative,
aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to
comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of
intelligence. These analytic deficiencies seriously undercut the ability
of U.S. policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat, and to
make fully informed decisions.78
The JIR discussion in support of this systematic finding pointed up the absence
of dissenting opinions in the Intelligence Community analysis provided to government
policymakers, quoting the testimony of Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage,
who observed:
I am the consumer. It’s very rare that we get the one off voice or the
dissent voice …. For a policy maker, the dissent voice is very helpful to
either confirm what you think or really open up a new area, and this is
not generally done. If I had to say the one biggest weakness in the
analysis area, I would say that’s it. Second, it’s the way analysis in the
Intelligence Community is generally put forth, and it’s related, and that
is consensus … I really would just enforce this observation about the
need to get alternative views up, because most everything that’s
important here is shrouded in ambiguity and uncertainty. There is a
15

tendency to want to get things scrubbed out to get the differences
eliminated.79
Third, systemic finding 8 addresses a “who’s on first?” problem: “the
continuing erosion of NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] program management
expertise and experience has hindered its contribution to the fight against terrorism.
NSA continues to have mixed results in providing timely technical solutions to
modern intelligence collection, analysis, and information sharing problems.”80
Fourth, systemic finding 11 focuses on ineptness, stating:
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community did not
effectively develop and use human sources to penetrate the al-Qa’ida
inner circle. This lack of reliable and knowledgeable human sources
significantly limited the Community’s ability to acquire intelligence that
could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks. In part, at least,
the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S.-recruited) counterterrorism sources was
a product of an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services.81
Fifth, systemic finding 15 is related to the aforementioned systemic finding
11.82 According to systemic finding 15, the American Intelligence Community
“depended [too] heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the
collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of counterterrorism
activities,” while “fail[ing] to coordinate their relationships with foreign services
adequately.”83
Finally, systemic finding 16 also reminds one of Abbott and Costello’s famous
routine. It states, in a sanitized version that had to be rewritten by congressional
staffers to satisfy national security reviewers:
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The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the United States appear
to have been financed, in large part, from monies sent to them from
abroad and also brought on their persons. Prior to September 11, there
was no coordinated U.S. Government-wide strategy to track terrorist
funding and close down their financial support networks. There was also
a reluctance in some parts of the U.S. Government to track terrorist
funding and close down their financial support networks. As a result,
the U.S. Government was unable to disrupt financial support for Usama
Bin Ladin’s terrorist activities effectively.84
E.

The “Show Me the Money” Problem.

The phrase “show me the money” was made popular in the film Jerry McGuire
when co-star Cuba Gooding Jr. as Rod Tidwell, the pro football player/client sticks by
his sports agent Jerry McGuire and insists that McGuire “show me the money.”85 It is
an apt phrase to remind us of the importance of money—and the converse situation of
a lack of money—in carrying out the pre-September 11 counterterrorism
responsibilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Two systemic findings in
the Joint Inquiry Report address “show me the money” problems: systemic findings 3
and 6.
Systemic finding 3 essentially blames inefficiencies in funding processes—
involving both Congress and the Intelligence Community—coupled with a multiplicity
of appropriation requirements and priorities in hindering an effective anti-terrorism
policy in the United States before 9/11.86 As explained, in cleaned-up-for-nationalsecurity-language in support of this systemic finding: “throughout the Joint Inquiry,
numerous officials … testified that the greatest constraint in their effort against alQa’ida was the availability of too few resources, compounded by too many
17

requirements and priorities.”87
Systemic finding 6 focuses on the lack of resources in translating foreign
language terrorist information.88 The JIR discussion on this point simply observed:
The language problem has been one of the Intelligence Community’s
perennial shortfalls. Prior to September 11, the shortages of language
specialists who would be qualified to process large amounts of foreign
language data in general, and Arabic in particular, was one of the most
serious issues limiting the Intelligence Community’s ability to analyze,
discern, and report on terrorist activities in a timely fashion.89
F. The “Dueling Banjoes” Problem.
The 1973 film, Deliverance, introduced the “dueling banjoes” scene and
subsequent hit song, featuring two banjo players trying to out perform and compete
with one another.90 While this analogy to the American Intelligence Community and
military is imperfect (in the film a certain synergy developed from the competition
while the pre-9/11 era American governmental action were discordant), the analogy
is of use in depicting the degree of competitiveness between segments of the federal
government in fighting terrorism. Two systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry Report
deal with “dueling banjoes” issues: systemic findings 7 and 14.
Systemic finding 7 highlights the friction between three key government
intelligence agencies: the FBI, the CIA and the NSA.91 One type of ongoing conflict
was between the NSA and the FBI over which agency should collect potentially
terroristic communications between individuals within the United States. This
created what the JIR called a “gap … between the level of communications between
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the United States and foreign countries that was technically and legally available to
the Intelligence Community and the actual use of that surveillance capability.”92
Another type of perennial friction was between the NSA and the CIA over “which
agency was in charge of developing and using technology when human intelligence
and signals intelligence targets overlapped.”93 Specifically, the “CIA perceived NSA
as wanting to control technology deployment and development, while NSA was
concerned that CIA was conducting NSA-type operations.”94
Systemic finding 14 addressed the distrust and tension between the American
military and the CIA in failing to better coordinate operations against Al Qaeda before
September 11th.95 From the CIA’s perspective, “the U.S. military often levied so
many requirements for highly detailed, actionable intelligence prior to conducting an
operation—far beyond what the Intelligence Community was ever likely to obtain—
that the U.S. military units were effectively precluded from conducting operations
against Bin Ladin’s organization” in south central Asia prior to September 11th.96
According to a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, he believed
that it was not the military’s key mission to go after Bin Ladin but, rather, he thought
“that the CIA and FBI should have the lead roles in countering terrorism, and that
military tools should be viewed as an extension and supplement to the leading roles
played by the CIA and FBI.”97 Moreover, the former Chairman was of the view that
“actionable intelligence” was too weak to outweigh the risks of military operations
that would attempt to “swoop[ ]” and pursue terrorists in an undeclared war in
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another country.98 Despite these conflicting positions from top government officials,
the JIR indicates that some cooperation between the CIA and the military directed at
Bin Ladin did ensue prior to 9/11.99
G. The “Through the Class Darkly” Problem.
According to scripture, some things we see “face to face” and completely;
other things are seen “through a glass darkly” and known only in part.100 In other
words, it is difficult to see through a turgid medium—even under the best of
circumstances. Systemic finding 12 of the Joint Inquiry Report concentrates on the
“through the glass darkly” problem in stating:
During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence Community was
bracing for an imminent al-Qa’ida attack, difficulties with FBI
applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance
and the FISA process led to a diminished level of coverage of suspected
al-Qa’ida operatives in the United States. The effect of these
difficulties was compounded by the perception that spread among FBI
personnel at Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA process
was lengthy and fraught with peril.101
The turgidness was one of law and the perception of law. Judicial
interpretations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), supposedly led to a
chilling effect on FBI agents who stopped applying for electronic surveillance orders
directed at Al Qaeda suspects.102
H. The “Good Cop/Bad Cop” Problem.
The “good cop/bad cop” paradigm is useful in describing scenarios where, on
the one hand, rules and processes are scrupulously observed, and, on the other hand,
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these rules and processes are ruthlessly ignored.103 Systemic finding 18 of the Joint
Inquiry Report can be understood as presenting a good cop/bad cop dichotomy. It
states:
Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterrorism strategy
adopted by the U.S. Government did not succeed in eliminating
Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training ground for Usama Bin Ladin’s
terrorist network. A range of instruments were used to counter alQa’ida, with law enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because
other means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to produce
results. While generating numerous successful prosecutions, law
enforcement efforts were not adequate by themselves to target or
eliminate Bin Ladin’s sanctuary. The United States persisted in
observing the rule of law and accepted norms of international behavior,
but Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida recognized no rules and thrived in the safe
haven provided by Afghanistan.104
The JIR expounded on this finding by pointing out the incredible naiveté, at
best, or recklessness at worst, of the executive branch of the United States
government during the period between 1996 and 9/11. According to the report’s
discussion, “[s]ome CIA analysts and operators … recognized as early as 1997 or 1998
that, as long as the Taliban continued to grant Bin Ladin’s terrorist organization
sanctuary in Afghanistan, it would continue to train a large cadre of Islamic
extremists and generate numerous terrorist operations.”105 Yet there was no
systematic executive branch effort to use all available means to root out and disable
Bin Ladin. As noted in the JIR: “Despite the Intelligence Community’s growing
recognition that Afghanistan was churning out thousands of radicals, the U.S.
government did not integrate all the instruments of national power and policy—
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diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military—to address this problem.”106
Moreover, the analysis goes on to state that “[p]ermitting the sanctuary in
Afghanistan to exist for as long as it did allowed Bin Ladin’s key operatives to meet,
plan operations, train recruits, identify particularly capable recruits or those with
specialized skills, and ensure that al-Qa’ida’s masterminds remained beyond the
reach of international justice.”107
The JIR’s most incisive support for its “good cop/bad cop” systemic finding
culminates discussion:
The reliance on law enforcement when individuals can operate from a
hostile country such as the Taliban’s Afghanistan appears particularly
ineffective, as the masterminds are often beyond the reach of justice.
One FBI agent, in a Joint [I]nquiry interview, scorned the idea of using
the [FBI] to take the lead in countering al-Qa’ida. He noted that the FBI
can only arrest and support prosecution and cannot shut down training
camps in hostile countries. He added that, “it is like telling the FBI
after Pearl Harbor, go to Tokyo and arrest the Emperor.” In his opinion,
a military solution was necessary because, “the Southern District of New
York doesn’t have any cruise missiles.”108
I. The “Catch-22” Problem.
This “Catch-22” problem, of course, is inspired by Joseph Heller’s famous postWorld War II novel109 which describes an American military rule allowing airmen to
contend that they were mentally unfit, and thereby unable to fly more missions, with
a cognate rule that such a claim conclusively indicated that the complaining airmen
was not crazy and would, therefore, have to fly more missions.110 As I use this
phrase, it seeks to convey the absurdity of having the United States Congress, seeking
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to publicly assess and critique the executive branch’s intelligence failures in the
years leading up to September 11, 2001, hamstrung by national security censors in the
executive branch so that certain intelligence failures are unknowable by virtue of
their deletion in the Joint Inquiry Report.
The Catch-22 problem is most prominently portrayed in JIR systemic finding 13
which consists of ten lines of bracketed and deleted text; not one word remains in
the Joint Inquiry Report of systemic finding 13!111 We are given tantalizing hints of
the content of systemic finding 13 in the discussion portion of the report. First, the
JIR, in sanitized prose, indicates that “[d]uring his tenure, President Clinton signed
documents authorizing CIA covert action against Osama Bin Ladin and his principal
lieutenants.”112 This analysis is followed by twenty lines of deleted text (including
two bulleted items amid this text). What are we to make of this? Like an
archaeologist, who finds a shard of pottery at an excavation site, we have little to go
on—other than the seeming relevance of presidentially-authorized CIA covert action
to systemic finding 13. Second, we get another clue, however, in the sanitized text
which follows these deletions:
Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified to the Joint
Inquiry … that, from the time of the East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings
in 1998, the U.S. Government was:
… embarked on an [sic] very intense effort to get Bin Ladin, to get
his lieutenants, thorough overt and covert means …. We were
involved—at that point, our intense focus was to get Bin Ladin, to
get his key lieutenants. The President conferred a number of
authorities on the Intelligence Community for that purpose [sic].
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Senator Shelby: By “get him,” that means kill him if you had to,
capture or kill him?
Mr. Berger: I don’t know what I can say in this hearing, but capture
and kill …. There was no question that the cruise missiles were not
trying to capture him. They were not law enforcement techniques
….”113
Aha! If we were archeologists that clue might be likened to finding the rest of
the pottery object such that we can now tell that the original shard came from a
container which held precious potions. Systemic finding 13 must deal (we would
surmise) with the CIA’s covert attempts to kill Bin Ladin and his henchmen!
A third clue to the probable substance of the JIR systemic finding 13 is an
unsanitized quote: “As former National Security Advisor Berger noted in his Joint
Inquiry interview, ‘we do not have a rogue CIA.’ “114 A “rogue” CIA? Does this mean
that Congress was onto some misbehavior of CIA operatives in trying to “get” Bin
Ladin? We are quickly disabused of this inference, however, in the fourth scrap of
discussion commentary in the JIR that ostensibly supports the phantom systemic
finding 13, quoting from the briefing provided by national security official Richard
Clarke:115
I think if you look at the 1980s and 1970s, the individuals who held the
job of DDO, one after another of them was either fired or indicted or
condemned by a Senate committee. I think under these circumstances,
if you become Director of Operations, you would want to be a little
careful not to launch off on covert operations that will get you
personally in trouble and will also hurt the institution. The history of
covert operations in the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s was not a happy one,
and I think that lesson got over-learned by people … I think that they
institutionalized a sense of covert action is risky and is likely to blow up
in your face. And the wise guys at the White House who are pushing
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you to do covert action will be nowhere to be found when the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence calls you up to explain the mess that
the covert action became.116
So, we suppose—but really cannot be sure—that the JIR concluded that the CIA
did a lousy job of “getting” Bin Ladin because of a culture that had developed in the
American Intelligence Community that disfavored and discouraged covert operations.
The “Catch-22” problem is also apparent in the sketchy, sanitized related
finding 20117 and the breathtaking 27 pages of backup discussion that is redacted and
deleted in the Joint Inquiry Report!118 We know by reading a sanitized version of
finding 20 at the back of the JIR that it deals with “information suggesting specific
sources of foreign support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were in
the United States”119 and information “concerning these potential sources of
support.”120 We also know that the JIR complained about the “gap in U.S.
intelligence coverage” and admonished that “[t]he Intelligence Community needs to
address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.”121 That’s it!
Was it secret support from Saudi Arabian sources that is hinted at in the sanitized
language of the Joint Inquiry Report?122
IV.

THE JIR RECOMMENDATIONS
As a sign of the haste (and sloppiness?) with which the Joint Inquiry Report was

put together, 19 specific recommendations were “inadvertently” left out of the JIR
and should have been included following the findings and conclusions portion of the
Congressional document.123 A cynic would be tempted to conclude that Congress got
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so accustomed to having scores of pages of the JIR deleted by executive branch
national security censors that they thought it would be a good idea to omit the
Congressional recommendations as well.
The congressional recommendations contained in the “errata print” addendum
of the Joint Inquiry Report can be usefully divided into three overarching categories:
(a) suggested statutory changes in national security laws, legislative budgetary
changes and the like; (b) requested reports from executive branch agencies on
national security topics; and (c) suggested executive branch actions on national
security. Some numbered recommendations in the JIR errata print contain more than
one category of suggested governmental changes; therefore, I will not bother to
reference the recommendations by the number, but will simply cite to the relevant
pages of the JIR errata print.
A.

Suggested Statutory or Budgetary Changes in National Security Laws.

The first and most prominent recommendation for statutory or budgetary
changes in national security laws is that Congress should “amend the National
Security Act of 1947 to create and sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National
Intelligence who shall be the President’s principal advisor on intelligence”124 with the
Director—a “Cabinet level position”125—“hav[ing] the full range of management,
budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence
Community operate as a coherent whole.”126 As part of the JIRs recommendation,
the Director of National Intelligence would have the legal authority, presumably set
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by federal statute, for the: (1) “establishment and enforcement of consistent
priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout
the Intelligence Community”127; (2) “setting of policy and the ability to move
personnel between elements of the Intelligence Community”128; (3) “review,
approval, modification, and primary management and oversight of the execution of
Intelligence Community budgets”129; (4) “review, approval, modification, and
primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community
personnel and resource allocations”130; (5) “review, approval, modification, and
primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community
research and development efforts”131; (6) “review, approval, and coordination of
relationships between the Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence
and law enforcement services”132; and (7) “exercise of statutory authority to insure
that Intelligence Community agencies and components fully comply with communitywide policy, management, spending, and administrative guidance and priorities.”133
The JIR, moreover, as part of the proposed establishment of this new supercoordinating and management czardom suggests that “[t]o insure focused and
consistent Intelligence Community leadership, Congress shall require that no person
may simultaneously serve as both the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or as the director of any other specific
intelligence agency.”134
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A second important proposal for statutory or budgetary changes, suggested
by the Joint Inquiry Report, concerns a new national security institution. According
to the JIR: “Congress and the Administration should ensure the development within
the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism
information fusion center”135 (IFC) with the goal that this novel organizational
innovation “will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism
analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information,
both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community.”136 Despite its
highfalutin name, the essential purpose of the “all-source terrorism information
fusion center” appears to be the creation of a centralized intelligence agency (why,
then, do we need both a CIA and an IFC?)137
The Joint Inquiry Report offers a third suggested statutory or budgetary action,
in the nature of oversight hearings. As the JIR states, in this regard:
The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees should
continue to examine the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its
implementation … particularly with respect to changes made as a result
of the USA PATRIOT ACT and the subsequent decision of the United
States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, to determine whether its
provisions adequately address present and emerging terrorist threats to
the United States. Legislation should be proposed by those Committees
to remedy any deficiencies identified as a result of that review.138
As a fourth statutory or budgetary suggestion—following up on other proposals
for centralization and coordination139—the JIR suggests that “Congress should
consider enacting legislation, modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill
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the concept of ‘jointness’ throughout the Intelligence Community.”140 As revealed in
the supporting language of this recommendation, the JIR appears to be simply calling
for more, good-old-fashion American teamwork:
By emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint career speciality,
increased authority for regional commanders, and joint exercises [the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986] greatly enhanced the joint warfighting
capabilities of the individual military services. Legislation to instill
similar concepts throughout the Intelligence Community could help
improve management of Community resources and priorities and insure
a far more effective “team” effort by all the intelligence agencies.141
Fifth, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends expansion and improvement of
“existing educational grant programs focused on intelligence-related fields, similar to
military scholarship programs” as a statutory and budgetary measure.142 As a sixth
statutory/budgetary suggestion, the JIR recommends that “Congress should … review
the statutes, policies and procedures that govern the national security classification
of intelligence information and its protection from unauthorized disclosure.”143
Interestingly, as part of this proposal, the JIR suggests that “[a]mong other matters,
Congress should consider the degree to which excessive classification has been used
in the past and the extent to which the emerging threat environment has greatly
increased the need for real-time sharing of sensitive information.”144 What does
“real-time sharing” mean? The most plausible interpretation appears to be sharing of
raw intelligence data as soon as it is reasonably made available. Another
interpretation might be access to a web-based data source where new intelligence
information is regularly updated and revised. Finally, the Joint Inquiry Report
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indicates as a seventh statutory or budgetary modification in existing national
intelligence and security laws: “as part of the confirmation process for Intelligence
Community officials, Congress should require from those officials an affirmative
commitment to the implementation and use of strong accountability mechanisms
throughout the Intelligence Community.”145 The language—“strong accountability
mechanisms”—reminds one of Orwellian-speak in his book 1984.146 One draconian
image that comes to mind is the kind of “accountability mechanism” practiced by Ian
Fleming’s character, Goldfinger, when one of his agents failed him (immediate
electrocution and disposal).147 A less horrific “accountability mechanism” might
simply be being fired from one’s job. But, as usual, the JIR utilizes congressional
jargon to make its points.
B.

Requested Reports From Executive Branch Agencies:

Numerous requests for reports are interwoven throughout the fabric of the
Joint Inquiry Report’s recommendations. First, the JIR wants the President to “take
action to ensure that clear, consistent, and current priorities are established and
enforced throughout the Intelligence Community” and to make certain that “[o]nce
established, these priorities” are “reviewed and updated” annually “to ensure that
the allocation of Intelligence Community resources reflect and effectively address the
continually evolving threat environment.”148 Under separation of powers principles,
of course, Congress cannot command the President to undertake his independent
constitutional powers as commander-in-chief149 or as leader of the nation’s conduct
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of foreign affairs150; but the JIR apparently contemplates that Congress could obtain
access to the aforementioned intelligence priorities information through Congress’
power of the purse151, by virtue of the following language contained in the
recommendations: “the establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, should be
reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees [by the President] on an
annual basis.”152 Second, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends a raft of reports from
“the new Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security” to be issued to both Congress and the
President “on a date certain” containing four specific matters: (1) an account of “the
FBI’s progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing the reforms required to
conduct an effective domestic intelligence program” including the “adequacy” of
“domestic intelligence authorities” regarding the pursui[t] [of] counterterrorism at
home and ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights guaranteed under the
Constitution”153; (2) an analysis of “the experience of other democratic nations in
organizing the conduct of domestic intelligence,”154 (3) an appraisal of “the specific
manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the
United States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully
protecting civil liberties”155; and the somewhat repetitive request for a set of
recommendations on how to best fulfill the nation’s need for an effective domestic
intelligence capability, including necessary legislation.”156 Third, the Joint Inquiry
Report turns its attention to the National Security Agency (NSA), presently lodged
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within the Department of Defense (DOD), seeking a “detailed plan” by June 30, 2003
to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees as well as to certain executive
branch officials157 that addresses the following five matters:
•

describes solutions for the technological changes for signals intelligence;

•

requires a review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, products to be delivered,
funding levels and schedules for every technology development program;

•

ensures … accounting for program expenditures;

•

within their jurisdiction as established by current law, makes NSA a full
collaborating partner with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the
collection and analytic capabilities of NSA, CIA, and the FBI; and

•

makes recommendations for legislation needed to facilitate these goals.158

Fourth, the Joint Inquiry Report requests the State Department, “in consultation with
the Department of Justice” to report to both the President and the Congress by June
30, 2003 “on the extent to which revisions in bilateral and multilateral agreements,
including extradition and mutual assistance treaties, would strengthen U.S.
counterterrorism efforts.”159 Fifth, acknowledging the political reality of an
independent investigative entity outside of the institutional structure of Congress,
brought about by the demands of relatives of 9/11 victims160, the JIR requests that
this entity, “the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States”
undertake “and make recommendations concerning how Congress may improve its
oversight of the Intelligence Community”161 including the following five policy and
legal issues: (1) “changes in the budgetary process”; (2) “changes in the rules
32

regarding membership on the [intelligence] oversight committees”; (3) “whether
oversight responsibility should be vested in a joint House-Senate Committee or, as
currently exists, in separate Committees in each house”; (4) “the extent to which
classification decisions impair congressional oversight”; and (5) “how Congressional
oversight can best contribute to the continuing need of the Intelligence Community
to evolve and adapt to changes in the subject matter of intelligence and the needs of
policymakers.”162 Sixth, concerned about what it perceived as the aggressive use of
classified information by the executive branch during the course of its investigation—
what Senator John McCain described as the administration having “slow-walked and
stonewalled” the congressional inquiry163—the JIR made the following remarkable
request:
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Attorney General, should review and report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees on proposals for a new and more
realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed
the designation of sensitive and classified information. The report
should include proposals to protect against the use of the classification
process as a shield to protect agency self-interest.164
Seventh, alarmed that the Intelligence Community had shrugged off
responsibility for the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the Joint Inquiry Report
sought a report from the CIA director “to the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees no later than June 30, 2003” regarding “the steps taken to implement a
system of accountability throughout the Intelligence Community, to include processes
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for identifying poor performance and affixing responsibility for it, and for recognizing
and rewarding excellence in performance.”165 As an eighth, and final, mandate for
executive branch reporting back to Congress, the JIR focused on the President:
The Administration should review and report to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2003 regarding what progress has
been made in reducing the inappropriate and obsolete barriers among
intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism,
what remains to be done to reduce those barriers, and what legislative
actions may be advisable in that regard. In particular, this report should
address what steps are being taken to insure that perceptions within the
Intelligence Community about the scope and limits of current law and
policy with respect to restrictions on collection and information sharing
are, in fact, accurate and well-founded.166
C.

Mandates for Executive Action.

The final category of congressional recommendations in the Joint Inquiry
Report concerns suggestions (or demands) on executive branch agencies. Ten calls
for further executive action can be discerned in the JIL:
•

A National Security Council-led and presidentially-approved “U.S.
government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and
abroad, including the growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies” with components
of the strategy to include “foreign policy, economic, military, intelligence,
and law enforcement elements that are critical to a comprehensive
blueprint for success in the war against terrorism.”167

•

The creation of the position of “National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism”
within the “National Intelligence Council” who would be “a highly qualified
individual appointed to prepare intelligence estimates on terrorism for the
use of Congress” and executive branch policymakers.”168

•

The implementation, by the FBI, of multiple measures to improve the
Bureau’s conducting of domestic intelligence by: better prioritization and
enforcement of field office compliance, developing independent career
tracks for counterterrorism, better training of strategic analysts,
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establishing “a strong reports officer cadre at the FBI Headquarters” to
ensure better dissemination of agents to analysts of key counterterrorism
information, agent training for better use of strategic analysis, recruitment
of agents with needed linguistic skills, increased penetration of terrorist
organizations operating within the United States through “all available
means of collection,” improved “national security law training” by FBI
personnel, improved exchange of counterterrorism information between
the FBI and other federal, state and local agencies, and remediation of
“the FBI’s persistent and incapacitating information technology
problems.”169
•

The accomplishment by the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI of
expanded and improved intelligence data obtained by an aggressive use of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.170

•

Transformation by the Intelligence Community led by the Director of
National Intelligence, of the “recruitment and development of a workforce
with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in
counterterrorist efforts.”171 Greatly enhanced training programs should be
launched and carried out in the following areas: “information sharing
among law enforcement and intelligence personnel; language capabilities;
the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and watchlisting[.]”172

•

Review and improvement under the direction of the President, of the
budgeting process of implementing American counterterrorism policy
including “consideration of a separate classified Intelligence Community
budget,” flexible appropriations “subject to congressional oversight, to
enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly respond to altered or
unanticipated needs”; and contracting for a “rigorous cost-benefit analysis
of the resources spent on intelligence.”173

•

Consideration by the President of possible amendments to “Executive
Orders, policies and procedures that govern the national security
classification of intelligence information” with an eye toward “expand[ing]
access to relevant information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence
Community, for state and local authorities, which are critical to the fight
against terrorism, and for the American public”, while also reassessing
existing presidential policy “to protect against the unauthorized disclosure
of classified intelligence information ….”174
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V.

•

Reviews by the “Inspectors General at the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of
State” of the factual findings of the JIR, coupled with further independent
internal reviews, “to determine whether and to what extent personnel at
all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or
failure to meet professional standards” dealing with “the identification,
prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of
September 11, 2001.”175

•

Development, under direction of the President, of “a national watch list
center that will be responsible for integrating all terrorist-related watch list
systems”, while “ensuring a consistent and comprehensive flow of terrorist
names into the center from all relevant points of collection.”176

•

FBI and CIA coordination and “aggressive[e]” investigation of “the
possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved
in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests.”177

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JOINT INQUIRY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
A remarkable aspect of the Joint Inquiry Report is the inclusion of some 190

pages of “[a]dditional views.”178 While the use of additional views in congressional
committee reports is well known,179 their significance is under-theorized. Are they in
the nature of judicial dissenting or concurring opinions?180 Are they mere grandstanding? A review of some of the eight separate additional views, filed by nine
members181 of the Joint Inquiry will touch on these questions. In general, takes as a
whole and considered together, these additional views highlighted the multi-flawed
legal process of the Joint Inquiry.
A.

Sen. Richard C. Shelby.

The most prominent of the additional views of members of the Joint Inquiry is
the filing of Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL). The prominence of the Shelby
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additional views is premised on two reasons: (1) he is Vice-Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence182 and (2) his views are spread out over 135
pages.183 Moreover, in a recent book, Shelby was quoted as saying this about the
difficulty encountered in obtaining information during the Joint Inquiry: “You know,
we were told that there would be cooperation in this investigation and I question
that”, noting, “I think that most of the information that our staff has been able to
get [from the executive branch] has had to be extracted piece by piece.”184
Shelby’s additional views contained several acerbic nuggets. First, drawing a
historical parallel between the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the
“devastating surprise attack the United States suffered at Japanese hands at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941”—Shelby urged the case for fundamental reform,
stating: “too much has happened for us to be able to conclude that the American
people and our national security interests can be protected simply by throwing more
resources at agencies still fundamentally wedded to the pre-September 11 status
quo.”185 Second, speaking of the structure and organization of the American
Intelligence Community, Shelby lambasted the Director of Central Intelligence’s “at
least partly rhetorical 1998 declaration of ‘war’ against Al Qaeda” and criticized “the
centrifugal tendencies of bureaucratic politics” within the Intelligence Community
with the upshot that the Community “responds too slowly and too disjointedly to
shifting threats.”186 In this regard, he urged “organizational flexibility”187and “a
continual process of ‘creative destruction’ not unlike competitive corporate
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approaches used in the private sector.”188 Third, focusing on information-sharing
concerns, Shelby went to considerable length in his additional views to critique the
Intelligence Community’s failure to “connect the dots” before 9/11189; to describe
the systemic and continual problems of information within the Intelligence
Community190; and to enthusiastically encourage future breakthroughs in innovative
techniques of information sharing.191 Highlighting the paramount intelligence sharing
failures that he believed the Joint Inquiry’s investigation revealed, Shelby opined at
length:
The CIA’s chronic failure, before September 11, to share with other
agencies the names of known al-Qa’ida terrorists who it knew to be in
the country allowed at least two such terrorists the opportunity to live,
move, and prepare for the attacks without hindrance from the very
federal officials whose job it is to find them. Sadly, the CIA seems to
have concluded that the maintenance of its information monopoly was
more important tha[n] stopping terrorists from entering or operating
within the United States. Nor did the FBI fare much better, for even
when notified in the so-called “Phoenix Memo” of the danger of alQa’ida flight school training, its agents failed to understand or act upon
this information in the broader context of information the FBI already
possessed about terrorist efforts to target or use U.S. civil aviation. The
CIA watchlisting and FBI Phoenix stories illustrate both the potential of
sophisticated information-sharing and good information-empowered
analysis and the perils of failing to share information promptly and
efficiently between (and within) organizations. They demonstrate the
need to ensure that intelligence analysis is conducted on a truly “allsource” basis by experts permitted to access all relevant information—
no matter where in the IC [Intelligence Community] it happens to
reside.192
Fourth, Senator Shelby’s additional views raise some useful points about
intelligence-law enforcement coordination. “The September 11 story,” as he put it,
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“illustrates the tremendous problems of coordination between U.S. law enforcement
and intelligence entities that developed out of a long series of misunderstandings,
timorous lawyering, and mistaken assumptions.”193 Even after 9/11 and the passage
of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001194, which amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA)195, Shelby expressed frustrations that “[i]t took over a year …
for the USA PATRIOT ACT changes to penetrate the U.S. Government’s entrenched
‘no coordination” bureaucratic culture.”196 Furthermore, in Shelby’s view, “[i]t was
not until November 2002 that the FISA Court of Review—the never before-used
appellate body created by the statute—issued an opinion” overruling the FISA trial
court that “the law … stands today where Congress intended it to stand” in passing
the USA PATRIOT ACT in October 2001: “there is no restriction upon coordination
between law enforcement and intelligence organs in connection with FISA
surveillance or physical searches, and such activity can lawfully be undertaken even if
primarily done with prosecutorial intent, provided that a ‘significant’ intelligence
purpose remains.”197 Fifth, in strong language of rebuke, Senator Shelby castigated
the domestic intelligence failures of the FBI leading up to September 11, 2001,
concluding that the FBI’s “organizational and institutional culture is terribly flawed”
and that the FBI “is fundamentally incapable, in its present form, of providing
Americans with the security they require against foreign terrorist and intelligence
threats.”198 Sixth, Shelby’s take on the CIA’s pre-9/11 human intelligence
performance is caustic. As he sees it, the CIA “has been too reluctant to develop
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non-traditional” forms of human-collected intelligence and “has stuck too much and
for too long with the comparatively easy work of operating under diplomatic cover
from U.S. embassies.”199 Seventh, regarding the topic of covert action, Senator
Shelby commented:
[G]iven the unpleasant history of covert action scandals that have
affected the CIA, one should not be surprised to find that—ironically,
perhaps—the covert action infrastructure is a relatively cautious one.
Intelligence officers will often, and with good reason, hesitate to
take operational risks or to push aggressively to accomplish their
missions if they are operating under ambiguous or convoluted legal
authorities and always suspect that they may be prosecuted or
hauled before a hostile inquiry for any actual or perceived
missteps.200
Finally, Shelby offered separate remarks to the Joint Inquiry Report on the
subject of accountability, “respectfully disagree[ing]” in his words from the view,
offered by some officials, that Congress “should postpone holding anyone accountable
within the Intelligence Community until [the] war” against al-Qa’ida is completed.”201
As Shelby put it: “Precisely because we face a grave and ongoing threat, we must
begin reforming the [Intelligence] Community immediately.”202 Speaking in a voice of
agitated dissent, Shelby employed understated outrage in the failure of the Joint
Inquiry to assess specific blame for the 9/11 disaster:
The metaphor of “war” is instructive, for wise generals do not hesitate
to hold their subordinates accountable while the battle still rages,
disciplining or cashiering those who fail to do their duty. So also do wise
Presidents dispose of their faltering generals under fire. Indeed,
failures in wartime are traditionally considered less excusable, and are
punished more severely, than failures in times of peace.
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Nor should we forget that accountability has two sides. It is also a core
responsibility of all good leaders to reward those who perform well, and
promote them to positions of ever greater responsibility.
***
For these reasons, it is disappointing to me that despite the Joint
Inquiry’s explicit mandate to “lay a basis for assessing the accountability
of institutions and officials of government” and despite its extensive
findings documenting recurring and widespread [Intelligence]
Community shortcomings in the months and years leading up to
September 11, the Joint Inquiry has not seen fit to identify any of the
individuals whose decisions left us so unprepared. I urge President Bush
to examine the Joint Inquiry’s findings in order to determine the extent
to which he has been well served by his “generals” in the Intelligence
Community.203
B.

Rep. Mike Castle.

Representative Mike Castle (R-DE) filed the functional equivalent of a short
concurring opinion to the Joint Inquiry Report focusing on two issues that he sought
to highlight: (1) the need for significant improvement in the performance of the
National Security Agency (NSA) in obtaining better signal intelligence concerning
global terrorism, and (2) the need for substantial, immediate reform “with respect to
the management, coordination and oversight of our Nation’s visa program.”204
Castle’s more telling comments concerned the matter of visa reform.
Alarmingly, as he explained:
The majority of the September 11th hijackers were wrongly admitted to
the United States—in violation of U.S. immigration laws—as a result of
decisions made and errors committed by responsible State Department
and Justice Department officers. The fact that many of them entered
and operated in true name, further emphasizes the extent to which the
current system is broken.205
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C.

Sen. Mike DeWine.

Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) crafted his separate remarks in the form of a
partial concurring opinion and partial dissent from the Joint Inquiry Report.206 Even
on those few points, where he seemed to be going against the grain of the JIR,
DeWine’s dissenting comments were collaborative in nature.207
DeWine made seven key arguments. First, he asserted that it was vital for the
Intelligence Committees of Congress to “improve the quality and quantity of
oversight” with regard to executive branch agencies seeking secret authorization,
pursuant to FISA, to conduct domestic intelligence.208 Second, in an intriguing
proposal, DeWine suggested the need for improving the FISA process by requiring the
appointment, by the secret court administering the statute, of “advocates”, chosen
from a group of “pre-cleared attorneys with prior FISA experience”209 who—while not
contacting or informing “the subject of the potential surveillance”—would, instead,
“act as officers of the [secret] court, representing the legal position in opposition to
the Justice Department’s application for a FISA warrant.”210
Third, Senator DeWine parted company with the JIR’s recommendation to
create a separate position of Director of National Intelligence, untethered from the
CIA, observing that a number of experts had concluded that this institutional isolation
would be “counterproductive.”211 Fourth, he urged the need to emphasize that “the
Intelligence Community needs to pay more attention to the collection and analysis of
open-source information” derived from available unclassified information like a
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report, written in 1999, by a Library of Congress analyst regarding the risk of Al
Qaeda suicide bombers flying airplanes into places like the White House and the
Pentagon.212 Fifth, DeWine opined that the “Senate and House Intelligence
Committees are asking for too many unnecessary reports” from members of the
Intelligence Community.213 Sixth, he offered an innovative potential technique to
enhance information-sharing among members of the sprawling and diverse American
Intelligence Community.214 According to DeWine:
A relatively simple way to address this would be through the use of a
technology known as “multi-level security” capability. Basically, the use
of multi-level security allows computers users with different levels of
security classification to get different levels of access to information
contained and stored in a comprehensive intelligence database. In
other words, database users would be able to access only the
information in the database that their security clearances allowed them
to view.
This would allow the myriad of intelligence agencies to safely combine
all of their databases, including those containing the most sensitive data
and make the entire combined database accessible to a wide range of
intelligence and law enforcement personnel, without sacrificing security
for the most highly classified data. For example, a detective in
Cincinnati who notices unusual activity around city hall could do a
search of the comprehensive Community-wide database for “city halls in
Ohio” and come up with some non-classified FBI information about
possible attacks on city halls around the state or in other states. He
then would get a notification from the system that there was more
information about the topic, but that it was classified at a level above
his clearance. At that point, he could go to his supervisor and begin the
process of having that information sent to someone within the
department who has the appropriate level of clearance. This would
help resolve one of the many information-sharing problems facing the
Intelligence Community.215
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Finally, Senator DeWine’s separate filing contains a thoughtful and in-depth
scenario for changing the existing American Intelligence Community’s “[b]roken
[c]orporate [c]ulture” which is risk averse, rather than prudently risk-taking.216 From
his perspective: “A new organization must be built from the ground up as a small,
agile, and adaptive organization with a corporate culture of taking prudent risks.”217
Moreover, it would have a limited list of targets: terrorists, proliferators, and ‘rogue
states’.” 218 And, its operations, according to DeWine, would emphasize “non-official
operations or NOC’s” 219 —unaffiliated with any official U.S. government “cover”
job220 and operating over long stretches of time with considerable autonomy. 221
D.

Rep. Jane Harman.

Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) offered a few nuggets of concurring insight which
enlarged on the Joint Inquiry Report. First, she pointed out that the JIR
recommendation for creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would
“empower” this official “to lead the [Intelligence Community] by pairing authority
with responsibility.”222 By way of comparison, Harman pointed out that the Director
of Central Intelligence “currently lacks the statutory authority” to provide “a
coherent approach across agencies and overarching leadership.” 223 Second, offering
a lighter touch than the tone of the Joint Inquiry Report, Rep. Harman opined that
while “[t]he investigation revealed that significant intelligence leads about some of
the hijackers were available but did not get widely shared,” this lapse “was less a
willful refusal to share information than it was a failure to grasp its significance.” 224
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E.

Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts.

In what is, in effect, a joint dissenting opinion from the JIR, Senator John Kyl
(R-AZ) and Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) divided their concerns into three major
headings:
(1)

“[t]he [n]eed for [a]dditional [v]iews,” 225

(2)

“[d]efficiencies in the [r]eport,” 226 and

(3)

“[c]omments on [r]ecommendations.” 227
1.

A Perspective on Process.

We gain a valuable insider’s peek on the Joint Inquiry process from the
perspective of two relatively junior and conservative United States Senators. They
begin their dissenting statement with a lament about how the content of the Joint
Inquiry Report was assembled. Thus, by examining their opening salvo, we can
discern that they were displeased with the way the staff and the combined
committees’ leadership controlled things. As they complain:
The Report is a product of the Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS), not the Senators
and the Representatives who sit, respectively, on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the SSCI and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the HPSCI (the “Big
Four”) made most decisions and supervised the JIS. The JIS should be
commended for putting together the first official account of events
leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
It is difficult, however, for rank-and-file Members of the two
Committees to know how thorough or accurate the Report is because of
the way the JIS and the “Big Four” conducted the inquiry, withholding
information and decisions from the Members and SSCI and HPSCI staff
throughout the process. While the Report should be a useful historical
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document on which to base further inquiries, we cannot vouch for its
contents. 228
A second, process-pique of Kyl and Roberts was that reasons why mistakes
were made by the Intelligence Community were not emphasized. As they noted:
After prodding by several Senators, some underlying causes of these
failures were identified, but even then, they were not further probed to
determine what might have been done differently. And the fact that
the prodding was necessary illustrates our concern that the JIS either
ran out of time or did not have the inclination or instruction to examine,
for instance, why U.S. government agencies were risk-averse, who is
responsible for the inadequate resources devoted to counter-terrorism
efforts, why legal authorities were so confusing, and why leadership
was so lacking. Without this examination, the Report will be of limited
value in determining “lessons learned.” 229

Fascinating stuff! There is more process vitriol. Third, Senators Kyl and
Roberts groused that the Joint Inquiry process “was conducted and overseen in a way
that left rank-and-file Members at a distinct disadvantage, and left insufficient time
to examine many relevant issues.” 230 In this regard, they grumbled that the
voluminous final draft of the JIR “was delivered to Members four days before the one
and only meeting scheduled for its consideration, when most Members were out of
town.” 231 Moreover, they griped that “[t]here was no debate about the Report, only
the Recommendations. But there was little basis for debate since the product was
strictly the work of the JIS—more like an Inspector General’s report than a typical
congressional committee report.”232 Roberts and Kyl provided numerous details of
what they perceived to be serious defects in the Joint Inquiry process that were
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labeled by the senators as “irregularities.” 233 These included the following:
•

“Upon instructions from the Chairmen—and in violation of
SSCI rules—the JIS often failed to tell Members and staff of
important non-compartmented information it discovered in
a timely manner.”234

•

“Information relating to open hearings such as the JIS staff
statement and witness statements—were routinely
provided only late on the night before the hearing.”235

•

“Committee staff and sometimes even the staff directors,
were often excluded from meetings of the “Big Four”,
whose decisions were often made without consultation.
Members’ liaison staff, and, therefore, the Members
themselves, were in the dark about these decisions.”236

A fourth key process failure noted by the joint separate statement of Senators
Kyl and Roberts dealt with the holding of open hearings by the Joint Inquiry during
the autumn of 2002. As extensively explained by these gentlemen:
The holding of open hearings was particularly frustrating. The
decision to hold them was apparently made by the “Big Four” despite
the concerns of the JIS and objections of other Senators. The JIS
was forced to focus on them for three months, and from there had to
go right into drafting the Report in order to meet the year-end
deadline.
Several Members voiced their opposition to holding open hearings
before the investigative work was completed and the Report written
(and, we had supposed agreed to). We objected, mostly in closed
committee business meetings, that it was premature to convene
open hearings before the investigation was complete. And indeed,
at the point when the JIS began preparing for them (July, 2002), its
investigations into the causes of 9/11 largely ground to a halt. Due
to dramatic media leaks and the potential for further compromise,
intelligence agencies “pushed back” against open hearings, causing
further friction with the JIS investigation.
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The hearings distracted these agencies, our “front line troops” on the
war on terrorism, and they distracted Members and congressional staff
from our traditional oversight responsibilities. They also, in our view …
publicly revealed a lot of sensitive information from which our enemies
could profit. Most of the information presented had already been
revealed in closed hearings which were far more productive because
those who participated could delve freely into classified information.
Key figures in our counter-terrorism efforts were unnecessarily
compromised by these public hearings. * * * We should have been more
circumspect about publicly releasing results before the investigation was
complete and the two intelligence committees had had a chance to
adequately review the final Report.237
2.

Claimed Deficiencies in the JIR.

Senators Kyl and Roberts explicitly linked the previously-discussed process
failures238, to a resulting substantive Congressional report “that falls well short of
addressing the core problems that led to 9/11.” 239 They confidently asserted in
support of this conclusion: “Because the fundamental problems that led to 9/11 are
almost certainly rooted in poor policy and inadequate leadership, the investigation
should have delved more deeply into conflicting interpretations of legal authorities
(including presidential directives), budget allocations, institutional attitudes, and
other key areas.” 240 As they explained in other words, “only such a thorough
exercise will help us to make sure the failures [of American counterterrorism policy]
are not repeated.” 241 Continuing to build on this assertion, the two senators
observed that “[w]hat best shows the tendency of the JIS investigations to go to the
water’s edge but no farther is that, in the Report, there is a pronounced tendency to
identify problems as ‘facts’, or ‘realities’, rather than as matters to be plumbed for
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underlying causes.” 242 The example provided here is staff analysis that did not dig
for the root causes of why the CIA did not make efforts to penetrate terrorist havens
in Afghanistan and why the Pentagon did not attempt a “comprehensive response” to
the terrorist bombings of American embassies in Africa in 1998 or the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole in 2000.243
The Additional Views of Senators Roberts and Kyl highlighted five additional
substantive deficiencies of the Joint Inquiry Report analysis and discussion: (a) “[r]isk
[a]version” 244, (b) “[i]nsufficient [r]esources245, (c) “[a] [f]lawed l]egal/[i]nstitutional
[f]ramework246, (d) “[l]eadership [f]ailures247, and (e) the “[i]nadequate [s]cope” 248
of the JIR.
3.

Criticism of JIR Recommendations.

The Kyl-Roberts statement closes with two specific criticisms of the JIR
recommendations and a general summary criticism of the failing of the JIR process.
First, they dismissed the notion that an “intelligence czar” would be able to “succeed
where they Director of Central Intelligence has not.” 249 Second, they objected to the
Joint Inquiry Report’s recommendation “calling for lower-level personnel to be held
accountable by the various agencies Inspectors General” instead of pursuing
“[a]ccountability of those at the very top” which would, in turn, “produce[ ]
accountability at the intervening levels, and among officers in the field who run down
leads to find terrorists.” 250 Finally, Senators Kyl and Roberts concluded: “Our duty to
understand precedes our ability to improve. The [JIR] in not fully coming to terms
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with what produced the intelligence failures it identified, left that duty
unfulfilled.”251
VI.

CONGRESS AND THE ART OF OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY.
A.

Congress’ Constitutional Role of Executive Oversight.
Relatively little has been written on Congress’ constitutional

responsibility to oversee the executive branch. Most commentators who have
considered the subject252 have focused on the need to counterbalance the
extraordinary power of the President and his executive branch officials in
implementing and interpreting laws passed by Congress, the responsibility of Congress
to assure that publicly appropriate funds are spent wisely and effectively and
according to the intent of Congress, and the salutary effects of publicizing
government operations in a free society. Oversight by Congress of executive branch
operations stems from the broad constitutional grant of “[a]ll legislative powers” to
the Congress253 made more specific by the interconnected all-encompassing web of
Article I Section 8 and Section 9 powers dealing with the funding and structuring of
executive activities.254
B.

The Lost Art of Congressional Oversight.
While the tradition of vigorous congressional oversight of executive

branch operations goes back in time more than 200 years255 in recent decades there
has been an “erosion of Congress’ oversight skills” and inclination to investigate
executive operations.256 Possible causes for this diminished effectiveness of
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congressional oversight include the packed schedules and shorter workweeks of
Senators and Members of Congress, term limits on chairmanships of congressional
committees, less funds for investigative staff, the hard-work and low-payoff of
traditional oversight by legislators, the higher priority given by legislators to
constituent services and legislative work, and political-pressure to go easy on the
executive branch during a time of same-party control of Congress and the White
House, since George W. Bush became President in January 2001.257
With regard to the combined Senate-House Joint Inquiry into the September
11th terrorist attacks, knowledgeable observers contend that Congress has been
“outperformed” by the National Commission on terrorist attacks.258 One
commentator has concluded that the independent commission—turned over to
commissioners outside of Congress: “has pried more disclosures about the 2001
terrorist attacks” than the congressional Joint Inquiry and “generated enough public
pressure to force national security advisor Condoleeza Rice to testify publicly, and
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to brief the panel in private—all witnesses that
the congressional” Joint Inquiry “never heard from.”259 Another observer,
commenting on the 17 preliminary staff reports written by the independent
commission on 9/11, noted, in implicit criticism to the congressional Joint Inquiry
Report:
In contrast to the plodding or self-promoting style of so many
government documents, the staff reports of the commission
investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks have provided something
truly rare in official Washington: a good read.
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In 17 crisply worded reports, the commission staff laid out facts from
the events that shook and marred the lives of millions. Using a style
that is remarkably free of artifice, the authors achieved a high point in
detail, clarity and coherence.260
C.

Improving Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism.
The conventional wisdom is that because of the profound distrust

between Republicans and Democrats in Congress there exists “political paralysis” to
conduct effective congressional oversight of executive counterterrorism activities and
to implement the type of structural changes needed to improve post-September 11th
national security.261 As this line of thinking goes, until the voters decide to create
divided government between Congress and the Presidency, nothing much will happen
to change the culture of counterterrorism policy in the CIA, the FBI and the
Pentagon.262 Perhaps this is correct. But looking to the long-term, there are some
institutional improvements that Congress should consider.
1.

Consolidate Intelligence Functions.

“Jurisdiction over the various intelligence agencies and their budgets is
currently divided among a number of committees” in both the House and the
Senate.263 Keeping up on the oceanic flow of 21st century counterterrorism policy
requires focus. “If lawmakers are going to try to consolidate the government’s
intelligence gathering operations, as they should, they can set a good example by
taking on the turf battles within their own ranks first.”264
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2.

Foster Intelligence Expertise.

Under current congressional rules, individual members of the
intelligence committees “may serve only a prescribed term.”265 This procedural
restriction “was adopted in the 1970s to prevent lawmakers from being co-opted by
the” executive branch’s intelligence agencies.266 In practice, however, members of
the House and Senate are “driven from the committees just as they develop the
necessary expertise to become … good overseer[s] of the intelligence community.”267
As a related reform, the House and the Senate “should consider limiting the number
of other positions that the leaders of the intelligence committees may hold to make
sure that they have all the time needed for their responsibilities.”268
3.

Experiment With More Decentralized and Indirect Forms of
Intervention.

While centralized statutory and budgetary changes in American
executive branch intelligence activities and counterterrorism policies are appropriate
(like the recent congressional acquiescence to the JIR recommendations for a
statutory change to create a new Director of National Intelligence and the
recommendation for a centralized all-source terrorism information fusion center
(IFC))269 innovative congressional initiatives that complement this fundamental
restructuring are needed to make sure that the executive branch is vigorously
following through on new counterterrorism reforms. The intelligence committees of
the House and the Senate should consider drawing upon the model of “destabilization
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rights” in public law litigation, articulated by Columbia Law professors Sabel and
Simon, whereby plaintiffs earn judicial approval “to disentrench or unsettle a public
institution when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum standards of adequate
performance and, second, it is substantially immune from conventional political
mechanisms of correction.”270
While counterterrorist institutional failures of key national security agencies of
the executive branch of the federal government, like the FBI, CIA and NSA fitfully
uncovered in the Joint Inquiry Report, are different from institutional failures of
public schools, mental health facilities, prisons, police departments and housing
authorities, these differences are in degree, not in kind.271 Institution building,
maintenance, repair and improvement have been a recurrent theme of American law
and democracy since Hart and Sacks articulated their vision of legal process
philosophy back in the 1950s.272 As they noted, in this regard:
[T]o help in seeing that the principle of institutional settlement
operates not merely as a principle of necessity but as a principle of
justice this means attention to the constant improvement of all of the
procedures which depend upon the principle in the effort to assure that
they yield decisions which are not merely preferable to the chaos of no
decision but are calculated as well … to advance the larger purposes of
society.273
Guido Calabresi, indeed, has described the legal process school as primarily
interested in “comparative institutional analysis”274 with new legal process legal
theorists of the Columbia School, like Sabel and Simon, embracing “a spirit of
Deweyen experimentalism by focusing on the development of new institutions”275 and
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institutional procedures.
Just as courts in various types of public law litigation involving schools, prisons
and the like have, with maturing experience, developed a general sense of the
“inadequacy of command-and-control approaches”276 of highly prescriptive and
detailed injunctive orders because they came to appreciate that “they lacked both
the information and depth and range of control to properly formulate and enforce
command-and-control injunctions”277, while “command-and-control interventions
exacerbated resistance on the part of [institutional] defendants”278, so should the
United States Congress and its intelligence committees develop a general sense of the
inadequacy of top-down, command-and-control statutory and budgetary measures to
alter the behavior of executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism agencies.
With the threat of imposing a “penalty of default”279 of fundamental restructuring of
executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism executive branch agencies or
appropriations riders, the intelligence committees of the House and the Senate
should seek to experiment with three specific decentralized and indirect forms of
congressional oversight borrowed from the Sabel-Simon new legal process insights
about recent trends in judicial supervision of public interest litigation. First, the
intelligence committees of Congress should seek to spur “stakeholder negotiation”280
superintended by a special mediator, with appropriate security clearance, appointed
by the relevant congressional committee. Conducted with authority of an ongoing
legislative oversight hearing, a congressional intelligence committee should mandate
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that all relevant stakeholders from the executive branch intelligence community
deliberate with each other (most frequently in secret closed sessions) “face to face”
and be required to “defend their positions with reasons.”281 Intelligence committee
imposed stakeholder negotiations should require participants “to listen to each other
in good faith and to remain open to learning”282 and “[t]o the extent that a
[stakeholder’s] proposals rest on factual premises, the [stakeholder] must make
available relevant information with her control”283 without the excessive security
blocks on sensitive information that has characterized past executive branch
responses to congressional inquiries. The goal of these stakeholder negotiations
under congressional oversight imprimatur should be consensus, to be achieved
through “openness”284 and “mutual respect”285 within the confines of the (often
secret) negotiations. The intelligence committees of Congress should strive to groom
one or more of its members to develop the role as mediator between executive
branch agencies because of the power and prestige this legislator would enjoy.
However, a professional, non-legislator intelligence/counterterrorism mediator,
under the control of the relevant congressional intelligence committees, might prove
to be useful as well.
Second, the intelligence committees of Congress should seek to instigate a
“rolling-rule regime”286 where the norms of counterterrorism policy emerging from
stakeholder negotiations with executive branch officials are “provisional”287,
“incorporate a process of reassessment and revision with continuing stakeholder
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participation.”288 Stakeholders would be urged by the congressional oversight
mediators to develop “performance measures that are as specific as possible”289,
leaving to executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism agency officials
“substantial discretion”290, subject, however, to “precise targets.”291 In addition,
“some processes, most often including documentation and reporting, will be specified
in detail.”292 With continuous feedback by the congressional mediators, the
intelligence committees of Congress should develop interim oversight reports which
include “general descriptions of the [intelligence/counterterrorism stakeholders’]
goals, prescriptions for measuring their progress toward them, and commitments to
make information available.”293 Moreover, these congressional interim intelligence
oversight reports might also include “a variety of other norms that set out, perhaps in
great detail, practices or operations procedures”294 of executive branch agencies.
Third, the intelligence committees of Congress should try to attain
“transparency”295 in the executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism
operations, which, at a minimum, insists that “the policies and operating norms of
the rolling-rule regimes must be explicit”296 and publicly declared to Congress
(subject to reasonable national security blocks to public access). Transparency
should be “both an accountability norm and a learning device”297, which is “intended
in part to facilitate practices of disciplined comparison.”298 Congress, when armed
with these comparative metrics—which might include private sector assessments of
performance of counterterrorism measures299—could reward those executive branch
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agencies which achieve good performance with autonomy and recommendations for
requested funding.300 “As for poor performance, the trick” for Congress would be “to
balance remedial support, loss of control, and outright punishment” of deficient
executive branch actions.301 But legislative oversight “[e]xperimentalism does not
provide determinate guidance on the question of sanctions. It pins hopes largely on
the effects of transparency”302 with a context of national security secretism. “By
exposing poor performance as clearly as possible, it opens the system to general
scrutiny and exposes it more readily”303 to congressional intervention.
CONCLUSION
The Joint Inquiry conducted by the intelligence committees of Congress to
ascertain the causes of executive branch failures to anticipate and possibly prevent
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was deeply flawed. Hobbled by secretism
and obstruction by the executive branch, including the lack of cooperation by the
President and Vice President, divided by partisan bickering within Congress,
distracted by misguided public hearings and accompanying political grandstanding
and weakened by poor leadership of the Senate and House intelligence committees,
the Joint Inquiry and its work product, the Joint Inquiry Report, suffered a lack of
credibility. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the Joint Inquiry on 9/11 can be
understood as part of a steady erosion in recent decades of the art of congressional
oversight of the executive branch of the federal government.
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Congress could help to rectify its lackluster performance of executive branch
oversight, in general, and improve its oversight of executive agency counterterrorism
performance, in particular, by considering three pragmatic internal congressional
reforms304: (1) consolidating intelligence review functions into the intelligence
committees; (2) fostering intelligence expertise of Senate and House intelligence
committee members; and (3) experimentation with more decentralized and indirect
forms of intervention by creating intelligence mediators who would be responsible to
Congress and who would seek to spur (a) stakeholder negotiation; (b) a rolling rule
regime of norms for counterterrorism performance and practice, and (c) transparency
in executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism operations, subject to
reasonable secrecy required by legitimate national security considerations.
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subcommittees, the name of one of the four subcommittees of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence—Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security—reflects the post-9/11 national
security context. See MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS-2004 (2003) at
1799, 1806. Interestingly, the House now has a separate committee that did not participate in the
JOINT INQUIRY called the Select Committee on Homeland Security with five subcommittees:
Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; Emergency Preparedness & Response;
Infrastructure & Border Security; Intelligence & Counterterrorism; and Rules. Id. at 1807.
15

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. There have been, however, joint committee undertakings in
the past by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. See infra note 255 and accompanying
text.
16

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 2.

20

Id. (three unnumbered pages following the title page). Interestingly, while the transmittal letter of
Dec. 20, 2002 to Robert C. Byrd, President Pro Tempre of the U.S. Senate, from Bob Graham, chair of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Richard Shelby, vice chair, indicated that the “highly
classified and sensitive information” not included in the JIR would be available to “all members of the
Senate” for readings in “secure facilities of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” id., the
House of Representatives transmittal letter was more restrictive. The transmittal letter of Dec. 20,
2002 to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, from Porter Goss, chair, and Nancy Pelosi, ranking
Democrat, while indicating that classified documents not included in the JIR would be held in “a
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)”, there was no mention in the transmitted letter
to the Speaker of the House of reading access by other members of the House to the classified
material. Id.
21

Id. (one unnumbered page following the Senate and House transmittal letter). The foreword
provides a three paragraph explanation for understanding additions and deletions to the original report
(before classification review). The foreword describes the process of JIR writing, classification,
addition and redaction as follows:
This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint Inquiry that was
approved and filed with the House of Representatives and the Senate on December 20,
2002. With the exception of portions that were released to the public previously (e.g.,
the additional views of Members, the GAO Anthrax Report, etc.), this version has been
declassified by the Intelligence Community prior to its public release. That review was
for classification purposes only and does not indicate Intelligence Community
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agreement with the accuracy of this report, or concurrence with its factual findings or
conclusions.
At appropriate points in the report, relevant information that developed after the
report was filed, or that has appeared in other public sources, has been inserted and is
denoted with an asterisk (*) and an accompanying footnote. Where necessary,
information that the Intelligence Community has identified as classified for national
security purposes has been deleted. Such deletions are indicated with brackets and a
strikethrough [ --------------]. In other portions of the report, alternative language that
the Intelligence Community has agreed is unclassified has been substituted for the
original report language which remains classified. Paragraphs that contain alternative
language, whether one word or several sentences, have been identified by brackets at
the beginning and end of the paragraph.
As a result of these changes to the text, the page numbers at the bottom of each page
do not match those of the original report. In order to preserve a record of the original
pagination, page numbers have been inserted in gray font [page xx] in the text to mark
where the corresponding pages begin and end in the original report.
Id.
From the process perspective of congressional oversight of executive intelligence
gathering, one is reminded of the Escher print, depicting a hand drawing another hand drawing
the original hand.
22

Id. at 1. This is the first page of the JIR that contains capital letters in gray font with a
strikethrough, at both the top and bottom of the page with the words “TOP SECRET”. Every page of
the JIR from i-435 bears the same “TOP SECRET” strikethrough markings.
The summary table of contents reads as follows:
Table of contents
Members of the Joint Inquiry
Joint Inquiry Staff
Abridged Findings and Conclusions
Recommendations
Final Report
Part One-The Joint Inquiry
• The Context
• Factual Findings
• Conclusions-Factual Findings
• Systemic Findings
• Related Findings
Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001
Part Three-Topics-The Attacks of September 11, 2001
Part Four-Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National
Security Matters
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Glossary of Terms and Key Names
Additional Views of Members of the Joint Inquiry
Appendices
Id.
23

Id. at ii-vii.

24

Id. at viii-x.

25

Id. at xi-xix.

26

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON JOINT
INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S.
REPT. NO. 107-351, H. REPT. NO. 107-792 (December 2002) (ERRATA PRINT) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY REPORT
ERRATA PRINT].
From the process perspective of congressional oversight of executive intelligence gathering, one is
reminded of a scene in the movie MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures, 1939) involving the
character of Jefferson Smith (played by Jimmy Stewart) being flustered and rattled by the august
presence of the more senior senator and his wiley daughter. Stewart drops and fumbles with his hat
throughout the scene, only to knock over a lamp at the end of the scene.
27

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 128-43.

28

Id. at 143-55.

29

Id. at 155-57. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

30

Id. at 157-68. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

31

Id. at 168-83. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

32

Id. at 183-87. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

33

Id. at 187-90.

34

Id. at 190-215. This heading of the JIR is subdivided into six sub-headings:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

A New Breed of Terrorists
Emergence of Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida
Attributes of Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations
Intelligence about Bin Ladin’s Intentions to Strike Inside the United States
Indications of a Possible Terrorist Attack in Spring and Summer 2001
Intelligence Information on Possible Terrorist Use of Airplanes as Weapons.

Id.
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It should be noted that the JIR uses different spellings for Al Qaeda. To the extent that I discuss
matters in my own language I will utilize the aforementioned spelling. Otherwise, when I am quoting
the JIR I will use the spelling provided by Congress.
35

Id. at 215-49. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs. This
heading of the JIR is subdivided into 19 sub-headings:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.

Counterterrorism as an Intelligence Priority
Growing Importance in the Clinton Administration
Uncertainty During the Transition
The George W. Bush Administration
Competing Priorities
Policy Measures to Fight Terrorism
The Law Enforcement Approach
Disruption and Renditions
Afghanistan as a Terrorist Sanctuary
The Intelligence Community
The Declaration of War
The Intelligence Community’s Response
Shortcomings in the Intelligence Community’s Response
The President and Senior Policy Advisor Responsibility
Lack of an Integrated Response
The Intelligence Community’s Failure to Establish a Coordinated Domestic Focus Before
September 11
Q. Steps Taken to Fight International Terrorism at Home
R. Lack of Focus on Domestic Threat
S. Limited Counterterrorism by Other Intelligence Community Members.
36

Id. at 250-70.

37

Id. at 270-78. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

38

Id. at 279-307. The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

39

Id. at 308-09.

40

Id. at 309-15. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

41

Id. at 315-24.

42

Id. at 325-35.

43

Id. at 336-45. This heading of the JIR is subdivided into four sub-headings:
A.
B.
C.
D.

The Intelligence Community’s Lack of Strategic Analysis
Analyst Qualifications and Training
Analysts’ Access to Information
Language Skills

64

Id.
44

Id. at 345-54. This heading of the JIR is subdivided into seven subheadings:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Setting Priorities
Strategy and Organization
Should a Strong Director of National Intelligence Be Established?
Should the Same Person be both DNI and Director of the CIA?
Counterterrorism Within the United States and Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency
A Legislative Charter for the Intelligence Community
Respect for the Rule of Law

Id.
45

Id. at 354-68.

46

Id. at 368-73. The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

47

Id. at 373-85. The vast majority of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

48

Id. at 385-93. A considerable portion of the content is deleted by brackets and strikethroughs.

49

Id. at 393-94.

50

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

51

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 424-33. Among the more fascinating definitions contained in
this portion of the JIR are the following:
Actionable Intelligence:
Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for immediate
exploration without having to go through the full intelligence production process; it
may address strategic or tactical needs, close support of US negotiating teams, or
action elements dealing with such matters as international terrorism or narcotics.
Id. at 424.
Asset:
(1) Any resource—a person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, supply—at
the disposition of an intelligence agency for use in an operational or support role.
(2) A person who contributes to a clandestine mission but is not a fully controlled
agent.
Id.
Clandestine Operation:
A preplanned secret intelligence collection activity or covert political, economic,
propaganda, or paramilitary action conducted so as to assure the secrecy of the
operation; encompasses both clandestine collection and covert nation.

65

Id. at 425.
Classification:
The determination that official information requires, in the interest of national
security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled
with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made; the
designation is normally termed a security classification and includes Confidential,
Secret, and Top Secret.
Id.
Counterintelligence:
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of
foreign powers, organizations, persons, or terrorist activities, but not including
personnel, physical, document, or communication security programs.
Id.
Counterterrorism:
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a terrorist act or the
documented threat of such an act.
Id.at 425-26.
Domestic Collection:
The acquisition of foreign intelligence information within the United States from
governmental or nongovernmental organizations or individuals who are willing sources
and chose to cooperate by sharing such information.
Id. at 427.
IC:
Intelligence Community—the aggregate of the following executive branch organizations
and agencies involved in intelligence activities: the Central Intelligence Agency; the
National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the
Department of Defense for the collection of specialized reconnaissance programs; the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements
of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and staff elements of the office of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Id. at 428-29.
International Terrorism:
Terrorist acts that transcend national boundaries in their conduct or purpose, the
nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the incident. Such an act is usually
designed to attract wide publicity to focus attention on the existence, cause, or
demands of the perpetration.

66

Id. at 429-30.
PDB:
President’s Daily Brief (prepared by CIA for President and very small number of other
senior officials)[.]
Id. at 431.
52

53

Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.

54

Id. (consisting of separately paginated additional views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Rep. Michael N.
Castle, Sen. Mike DeWine, Rep. Jane Harman, Sen. John Kyl, and Sen. Pat Roberts, Sen. Carl Levin, Sen.
Barbara Mikulski, Rep. Jim Roemer).
55

Id. The list of appendices to the JIR includes the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Initial Scope of Joint Inquiry.
Supplemental Joint Inquiry Rules.
Joint Inquiry Hearings.
List of Persons Interviewed.
Counterterrorism Organizations Within the Intelligence Community.
Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 1983-2001.
Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001.
CIA/FBI Failures in Regard to Two September 11 Hijackers, The Phoenix Electronic
Communication.
Moussaoui Related FBI Field Agent Notes and Field Office/Headquarters E-mails.
General Accounting Office: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax Attacks.
CTC Watchlisting Guidance—December 1999.
The Joint Inquiry in Court.
Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry.

Id. While a detailed discussion of these voluminous appendices is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
tempting to offer a few miscellaneous comments. First, most of the names on the Appendix List of
Persons Interviewed are deleted by brackets and strikethroughs, although their official positions are
referenced. Second, the Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 1983-2001,
provides a synoptical summary of “big picture” world events, “selected major terrorist events”, and
“U.S. institutional responses to terrorism”, although a considerable portion of the content is deleted by
brackets and strikethroughs. Third, the Appendix-Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 19822001 offers a striking visual timeline of the following types of information: terrorist incident,
information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States, information
indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons, and communications intercepts
suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities. Fourth, the Appendix Joint Inquiry in Court details
the tripartite branch processes of the executive, legislative and judicial branches surrounding the
investigation and litigation involving Zacarias Moussaoui—the suspected “20th hijacker” on 9/11. Legal
counsel from the congressional offices of Senate Legal Counsel, House General Counsel, and General
Counsel of the Joint Inquiry were involved in contesting a DOJ-sought judicial protective order in the
Moussaoui case. According to this Appendix:
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With the assistance of the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel,
the General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry … participated in the argument on August 29,
2002. The reply asked the District Court to deny the DOJ’s requested relief for three
main reasons: (1) the protective order does not govern testimony before Congress, nor
does it govern the production of documents to Congress, the use of documents by it, or
the issuance of its reports; (2) Local Criminal Rule 57 specifically does not preclude the
holding of legislative hearings or the issuance of legislative reports, and (3) the
proposed expansion of the [protective] order by the Department of Justice runs afoul of
the separation of powers.
Id., Appendix Joint Inquiry in Court at 3. The DOJ lost its motion to expand the scope of the Moussaoui
judicial protective order to cover the Joint Inquiry legislative proceedings. Id. at 4-5. Yet, the
following novel procedure was allowed by the Joint Inquiry:
In accordance with its commitment to consult with the Department of Justice, the Joint
Inquiry continued to allow DOJ to review and comment regarding the contents of staff
statements related to the Moussaoui case and other matters. At the Joint Inquiry’s
September 24 [2002] public hearing that followed concerning the Moussaoui matter, the
Joint Inquiry permitted a DOJ representative to attend with FBI witnesses for the
purpose of advising whether any question called for an answer that might impair the
Moussaoui prosecution. Thus, the Inquiry was able to proceed with a full public
exposition of the issues raised in the Moussaoui investigation without impeding the due
process and fair interests of Moussaoui and the DOJ.
Id. at 5.
56

Factual finding of the JIR states:
While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence
regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time,
place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001.
Nonetheless, the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the
September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance.

Id. at xi.
57

Factual finding of the JIR states:
During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experienced a
significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to
strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.

Id.
58

Factual finding of the JIR states:
Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community
received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that
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indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless,
testimony and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence
Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks
would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and
intentions to attack in the domestic United States.
Id.
59

Factual finding 4 of the JIR states:
From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence
Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among
other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not
stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S.
Government reaction to, this form of threat.

Id.
60

Factual finding number 5 of the JIR consists of an overarching finding and, then, ten sub-findings
numbered 5a through 5j, inclusive. Overarching finding number 5 states:
Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was
available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, the Community
too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective
significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence
Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new
transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data
being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at
the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the
part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have
been established. For all these reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully
capitalize on available, and potentially important, information.
Id. Five of the sub-findings relate to the forest from the trees problem: sub-finding 5a concerning
“[t]errorist [c]ommunications in 1999” about persons who, after September 11, 2001, were connected
with the terrorist attacks of that day, id. at (JIR brackets omitted) sub-finding 5b concerning “Malaysia
[m]eeting and [t]ravel of al-Qaida [o]peratives to the United States” regarding a 2000 rendezvous
between two individuals who had a key role in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, id.; and subfinding 5c dealing with [t]errorist [c]ommunications in [s]pring 2000 regarding known communication
involving an individual who had attended the Malaysia meeting, id.(JIR brackets omitted) sub-finding 5g
concerning “[h]ijackers in [c]ontact [w]ith [p]ersons of FBI [i]nvestigative [i]nterest in the United
States,” id. at xiv; and sub-finding 5h concerning the CIA’s awareness, but missed opportunities, of the
[h]ijackers’ [a]ssociation in Germany.” Id. (JIR brackets omitted).
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Related finding 17 of the JIR, id. at xvii.

62

Related finding 19 of the JIR, id. at xix.

63

Conclusion-factual findings of the JIR, id. at xv (emphasis added).

69

64

Systemic finding 1, id.

65

Factual sub-finding 5d, id. at xii.

66

Systemic finding 9 of the JIR states:
The U.S. Government does not presently bring together in one place all terrorismrelated information from all sources. While the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center does
manage overseas operations and has access to most Intelligence Community
information, it does not collect terrorism-related information from all sources,
domestic and foreign. Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately
share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11. This breakdown in
communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the
agencies’ missions, legal authorities and cultures. Information was not sufficiently
shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within
individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.

Id. at xvii (emphasis added).
67

Systemic finding 10 of the JIR provides:
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted prior to September 11, between
the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies. This
included other federal agencies as well as state and local authorities. This lack of
communication and collaboration deprived those other entities, as well as the
Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable information in the “war”
against Bin Ladin. The Inquiry’s focus on the Intelligence Community limited the
extent to which it explored these issues, and this is an area that should be reviewed
further.

Id. (emphasis added).
68

For an updated version see JAMES FINN GARDNER, POLITICALLY CORRECT BEDTIME STORIES 57-62 (1994).

69

Factual sub-finding 5e, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xii. For a journalistic account of the
FBI and international terrorism leading up to the events of 9/11 see generally PETER LANCE, 1000 YEARS
FOR REVENGE: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE FBI—THE UNTOLD STORY (2003).
In the discussion supporting factual sub-finding 5e, the JIR suggests that the problem was, at
bottom, a resource issue. Before the Joint Inquiry, the Phoenix agent who authored the Phoenix
communication testified that:
“What I wanted was an analytical product. I wanted this discussed with the
Intelligence Community. I wanted to see if my hunches were correct. He noted,
however, that he also knew this type of analytical product took a back seat to
operational matters at the FBI:
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But, I am also a realist. I understand that the people at FBI Headquarters
are terribly overworked and understaffed, and they have been for years.
And at the time that I am … sending this in, having worked this stuff for 13
years, and watched the unit in action over the years, I knew that this was
going to be at the bottom of the pile, so to speak, because they were
dealing with real-time threats, real-time issues trying to render fugitives
back to the United States from overseas for justice. And again, it is a
resource issue.
The Phoenix agent was correct, and his communication did fall to the bottom of the
pile. * * *
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21.
70

Bud Abbott and Lou Costello, Who’s On First?, performed in THE NAUGHTY NINETIES (1945).

71

Factual sub-finding 5f, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xiii. The sub-finding provides:
In August 2001, the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, in conjunction with the INS
[Immigration and Naturalization Service], detained Zacarias Massouri, a French national
who had enrolled in flight training in Minnesota. FBI agents there also suspected that
Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot. FBI Headquarters determined that there
was not probable cause to obtain a court order to search Moussaoui’s belongings under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel at FBI
Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalism Unit and the National Security Law
Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolis field office, misunderstood the legal
standards for obtaining an order under FISA. As a result, FBI Minneapolis field office
personnel wasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect the Chechen rebels
to al-Qa’ida. Finally, no one at the FBI apparently connected Moussaoui investigation
with the heightened threat environment in the summer of 2001, the Phoenix
communication, or the entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States.

Id.
72

Factual sub-heading 5i, id. at xiv. The sub-finding states:
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid
Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as the
mastermind of the attacks to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use an aircraft as weapons,
and to terrorist activity in the United States. The Intelligence Community, however,
relegated … KSM to rendition target status following his 1996 indictment in connection
with the Bojinka Plot and, as a result, focused primarily on his location, rather than his
activities and place in the al-Qa’ida hierarchy. The Community also did not recognize
the significance of reporting in June 2001 concerning KSM’s active role in sending
terrorists to the United States, or the facilitation of their activities upon arriving in the
United States. Collection efforts were not targeted on information about KSM that
might have helped better understand al-Qa’ida’s plans and intentions and KSM’s role in
the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the Intelligence Community.

71

Id.
73

Factual sub-finding 5j, id. at xv. The sub-finding provides:
In the period from September 8 to September 10, 2001, NSA intercepted, but did not
translate or disseminate until after September 11, some communications that indicated
possible impending terrorist activity.

Id. (brackets omitted). The discussion supporting sub-finding 5j is largely deleted or bracketed. Id. at
32.
74

Id. at xvi.

75

Id. at 39.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 41(original emphasis).

78

Id. at xvi.

79

Id. at 68.

80

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii. The discussion in support of this systemic finding
mentions a lack of basic skills by NSA personnel, “frustration regarding their current working
environment”, and “a high level of frustration among contractors who do business with the NSA.”
Id. at 76-7.
81

Id. at xvii. The discussion in support of this systemic finding has been sanitized by substantial
deletion of national security sensitive information. See id. at 90-96.
82

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.

83

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii. The discussion in support of this systemic finding is
mostly uninformative because of the substantial deletion of national security sensitive information.
See id. at 109-13.
84

Id. (brackets omitted). As one would expect in a situation where even the systemic finding, itself,
was subject to revision on grounds of national security, the discussion supporting this finding is likewise
sanitized. See id. at 113-17.
85

JERRY MCGUIRE (Jerry McGuire Productions 1996).

86

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvi. Systemic finding 3 states:
Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, overall Intelligence
Community funding fell or remained even in constant dollars, while funding for the
Community’s counterterrorism efforts increased considerably. Despite these increases,
the accumulation of intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirement process, the

72

overall decline in Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on supplemental
appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community resources effectively against an
evolving terrorist threat. Inefficiencies in the resource and requirements process were
compounded by problems in Intelligence Community budgeting practices and
procedures.
Id.
87

Id. at 46 (brackets omitted).

88

Id. at xvi.

89

Id. at 70.

90

Dueling Banjos (from the Movie DELIVERANCE Soundtrack 1973).

91

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvi. Systemic finding 7, in sanitized language, provides:
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s ability to produce significant and
timely signals intelligence on counterterrorism was limited by NSA’s conflict between
Intelligence Community agencies, NSA’s cautious approach to any collection of
intelligence relating to activities in the United States, and insufficient collaboration
between NSA and FBI regarding the potential for terrorist attacks within the United
States.

Id. (brackets omitted).
92

Id. at 74-5 (brackets omitted).

93

Id. at 75 (brackets omitted).

94

Id. (brackets omitted).

95

Systemic finding 14, edited for reasons of national security, states:
Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to use U.S. military assets to conduct
offensive counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, or to support or participate in CIA
operations directed against al-Qa’ida prior to September 11. At least part of this
reluctance was driven by the military’s view that the Intelligence Community was
unable to provide the intelligence needed to support military operations. Although the
U.S. military did participate in [ ---- ] counterterrorism efforts to counter Usama Bin
Ladin’s terrorist network prior to September 11, 2001, most of military’s focus was on
force protection.

Id. at xviii (brackets omitted).
96

Id. at 107.

97

Id. at 106.
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98

Id.

99

These included cruise missile attacks against Bin Ladin on August 20, 1998, “following the bombings
of two U.S. embassies in East Africa”, id. at 108, (brackets omitted); positioning of U.S. naval vessels in
the North Arabian Sea between 1999 and 2001 “to launch additional cruise missile strikes at Bin Ladin in
the event the Intelligence Community was able to obtain precise information on his whereabouts in
Afghanistan”, id. (brackets omitted); and military assistance “in the development of the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle as a second source of intelligence on Usama Bin Ladin’s precise whereabouts in
Afghanistan.” Id. (brackets omitted).
100

1 COR. 13:12 states: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face-to-face; now I know, in
part, then shall I know even as also I am known.”
101

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii.

102

Id. at 96-97.

103

My sense of using the term “good cop, bad cop” differs a bit from its typical use as “a psychological
tactic, often used by police for interrogation”. Thus:
Two ‘cops’ alternate their interviews. The ‘Bad Cop’ behaves negatively toward the
subject, making blatant accusations, derogatory comments, threats, and in general
raising the subject’s antipathy. This sets the stage for the ‘Good Cop’ to deceptively
act supportive, understanding, defensive, and in general show sympathy for the
subject, which may make the subject cooperative towards the latter.
http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/Good%20cop%Fbad%20cop.
104

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii-xix (emphasis added).

105

Id. at 120.

106

Id. at 121 (brackets omitted). Tellingly, there is a bracketed and deleted two and a half sentence
set forth in the JIR after the quoted sentence in the text—presumably a detailed assessment of specific
executive branch failings to support the topic sentence of the paragraph—excised by national security
censors.
107

Id.

108

Id. at 123 (brackets omitted in last two sentences).

109

JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).

110

See generally, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE 176-77 (Margaret Drabble, ed., 5th ed.
1985).
111

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii-xviii.
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112

Id. at 98 (Brackets omitted).

113

Id. at 98-99 (brackets omitted).

114

Id. at 99.

115

As of April of 2004, Richard Clarke’s exposé book on pre-9/11 events was a national bestseller. See
RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (2004).
116

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 100 (emphasis added).

117

Id. at xix. The language of finding 20 in the summary findings simply states: “Located in Part Four
entitled “Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters.” Id.
A sanitized, expanded version of finding 20 is found buried at the end of the report. Id. at 395.
118

Id. at 296-422. Isolated, unhelpful words and phrases are sprinkled throughout these pages. See
e.g. id. at 406 (“The Joint Inquiry also found”), id. at 413 (“In testimony before the Joint Inquiry”), id.
at 416 (“Finally”). Why did Congress bother to insert these inane phrases amid a sea of deleted pages?
119

Id. at 395 (brackets omitted).

120

Id. (brackets omitted).

121

Id. (brackets omitted).

122

See generally, LANCE, supra note 69. Cf. BOB GRAHAM, INTELLIGENCE MATTERS: THE CIA, THE FBI, SAUDI
ARABIA AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 168-69, 202, 216, 225, 229, 237 (2004)(arguing financial
support of Saudi Arabia for terrorists).
123

JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 1. Sloppiness is further apparent in the ERRATA print’s
footnoted reference to a “[l]ist of previous commissions that addressed intelligence organizational
issues, 1990-present” and its omission of these commissions from both the original JIR and the ERRATA
print. Perhaps, the footnote is a sloppy reference to the “Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat
and the U.N. Response, 1983-2001”, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at App. 5-49.
124

Id. at 2.

125

Id. at 3.

126

Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 3.
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131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

136

Id.

137

According to the JIR, the “information fusion center” (IFC) should be given legal authority and
resources needed to:
–
–

–
–
–

–
–
–

have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information,
including “raw” supporting data as needed;
have the ability to participate fully in the existing requirements process for tasking
the Intelligence Community to gather information on foreign individuals, entities
and threats;
integrate such information in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of
terrorist threats to the United States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities;
implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced analytical tools,
consistent with applicable law;
retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled analysts, supplemented
on a regular basis by personnel on “joint tours” from the various Intelligence
Community agencies;
institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all the intelligence and
law enforcement agencies without waiting for dissemination of a formal report;
maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills through regular use of
analysis and language training programs; and
establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of counterterrorismrelated information with federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community as
well as with state and local authorities.

Id. at 5-6.
138

Id. at 9-10.

139

See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.

140

JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 11.

141

Id. The JIR recommendation continues by stating:
The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive use of “joint tours”
for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement personnel to broaden their
experience and help bridge existing organizational and cultural divides through service
in other agencies. These joint tours should include not only service at Intelligence
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Community agencies, but also service in those agencies that are users or consumers of
intelligence products. Serious incentives for joint services should be established
throughout the Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint
service with career advancement credit at individual agencies. The Director of
National Intelligence should also require Intelligence Community agencies to participate
in joint exercises[.]
Id. at 11-12.
142

Id. at 12.

143

Id. at 14.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 15.

146

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948).

147

See Ian Fleming’s classic book, GOLDFINGER (1959).

148

JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 3-4.

149

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

150

See id., art. II, § 2, cls. 4-5.

151

See id., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

152

JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 4.

153

Id. at 8. The JIR goes on to request, by way of a prominent example, executive branch proposals
on “whether the range of persons subject to searches and surveillances authorized under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) should be expanded.” Id.
154

Id. Comparative law perspectives are usually helpful in pondering the content and structure of
legislation. But query: have the domestic intelligence problems of the United States—the world’s sole
“super-power” with the enmity of many groups from around the world—become sui generis? Perhaps
the experience of Israel in conducting its domestic intelligence would be most apropos to the domestic
intelligence program needed for the United States in the post 9/11 era.
155

Id. at 9.

156

Id.

157

Id. at 10.

158

Id. The language used by the JIR is ambiguous and open to varying interpretations. As a final shot
over the bow of NSA, the JIR in conjunction with the forthcoming requested report from NSA indicates
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as follows: “In evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider issues pertaining to whether
civilians should be appointed to the position of Director of National Security Agency and whether the
term of service for the position should be longer than it has been in the recent past.” Id.
159

Id. at 13. Interestingly, the JIR wants the State Department review to “address the degree to
which current categories of extraditable offenses should be expanded to cover offenses, such as visa
and immigration fraud, which may be particularly useful against terrorists and those who support
them.” Id.
160

See generally JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE 113-14 (2004) (“Because of the lack of White
House cooperation with the joint inquiry, the families of 9/11 victims began lobbying Congress to
create an independent commission, with subpoena power, to investigate 9/11, even before the
congressional effort had been completed”). Of course, the Joint Inquiry, acting through the respective
houses of Congress, could have subpoenaed all pertinent documents that it wanted from the executive
branch. See generally LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, eds. 2nd ed. 2002) 216-30
(discussing compulsory process before congressional committees).
161

JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 13. In July of 2004 the commission issued its report.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This report “concluded in its unanimous final report … that
the attacks were a shock but they should not have come as a surprise.” Philip Shenon, ‘We Are Not
Safe’: Commission Warns of Another Catastrophe Under Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A1
(internal quotiation marks omitted). For an account of the formation of the Commission because of the
perceived lack of success of the Joint Inquiry by Congress see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., 2002 ALMANAC
7-18-7-19 (2003).
162

Id. at 14. JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 14.

163

DEAN, supra note 160, at 113.

164

JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 15 (emphasis added).

165

Id.

166

Id. at 16. In what may be called an omnibus reporting mandate, the following language appears at
the close of the JIR recommendations: “The Intelligence Community should fully inform the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees of significant developments [regarding evidence of state sponsored
terrorism], through regular reports and additional communications” with the expectation that “the
[congressional] Committees should, in turn, exercise vigorous and continuing oversight of the
[Intelligence] Community’s work in this critically important area.” Id. at 17.
167

Id. at 4. The JIR goes on to specify how Congress would like this national counterterrorism strategy
to look including discussion of the following:
–
–

develop[ing] human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks both
overseas and within the United States;
fully utilize[ing] existing and future technologies to better exploit terrorist
communications; to improve and expand the use of data mining and other cutting
edge analytical tools; and to develop a multi-level security capability to facilitate
the timely and complete sharing of relevant intelligence information both within
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–

–
–
–

the Intelligence Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and local
authorities;
enhance[ing] the depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection and analysis
by, for example, modernizing current intelligence reporting formats through the
use of existing information technology to emphasize the existence and the
significance of links between new and previously acquired information;
maximize[ing] the effective use of covert action in counterterrorist efforts;
develop[ing] programs to deal with financial support for international terrorism;
and
facilitate[ing] the ability of CIA paramilitary units and military special operations to
conduct joint operations against terrorist targets.

Id. at 4-5.
168

Id. at 5.

169

Id. at 7-8.

170

Id. at 9.

171

Id. at 10.

172

Id. at 11. One of the more intriguing specific congressional recommendations is a “Civilian Linguist
Reserve Corps” outside of the Intelligence Community “whose abilities are relevant to the needs of
counterterrorism[.]” Moreover, ever “politically correct” in its aspirations, the JIR directs that:
the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and
culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique culture
and linguistic capabilities of first-generation Americans, a strategy designed to utilize
their skills to the greatest practical effect, while recognizing the potential
counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might pose.
Id. at 12.
173

Id. at 12-13.

174

Id. at 14.

175

Id. at 15-16.

176

Id. at 16.

177

Id.

178

See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, following page 435. The “additional views” are separately
paginated. Citation will be to the JOINT INQUIRY REPORT followed by a parenthetical reference to the
congressional member filing the additional views and a page reference to the member’s separate
pagination. For example, id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 7).
179

See e.g. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 160, at 284-85.

79

180

Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade Dissenting
Judicial Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward An Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73
(2004). See also CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
181

The additional views of members are as follows and appear in the following order:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-AL) (135 pages)
Rep. Michael N. Castle (R-DE) (2 pages)
Sen. Mike DeWine (R-OH) (16 pages)
Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) (5 pages)
Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ) and Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) (21 pages)
Sen. Carl Levin (D-MN) (3 pages)
Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) (3 pages)
Rep. Tim Roemer (D-IN) (5 pages)

A total of 17 U.S. Senators and members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were part of
the JOINT INQUIRY. A total of 20 U.S. Representatives and members of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, were part of the Joint Inquiry. Therefore, 9 out of 37 (or about 24%) of the
Joint Inquiry members filed additional views.
182

See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at viii.

183

See supra note 181 and accompanying text.

184

DEAN, supra note 160, at 113 (footnote omitted).

185

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 3).

186

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 4). In partial support of his reference to
centrifugal tendencies, Shelby observed: “The most obvious problem with respect to the IC’s
[Intelligence Committee’s] ability to act as a coherent and effective whole is the fact that more than
80 percent of its budgets and personnel resources are controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD).”
Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 21).
187

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 28). He elaborated in this point by observing:
This is what might be called the “meta-lesson” of our current round of “lessons
learned” studies of intelligence failures: we must not only learn the lessons of the past
but learn how to keep learning lessons as we change and adapt in the future. Adopting
uniform personnel standards would help the Community ensure that its personnel and
organizational units remain unique and valuable individual resources but they would
also become administratively fungible assets, capable of being reorganized and
redirected efficiently as circumstances demand.

Id. (original emphasis).
188

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 29).
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189

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 33-46).

190

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 47-51).

191

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 52-70).

192

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 6-7).

193

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 8).

194

Pub. L. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001).

195

18 U.S.C. § 1801, et. seq.

196

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7 (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 86).

197

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 89) (original emphasis) (footnote omitted).

198

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 10). He went on to contend:
In light of the FBI’s dismal recent history of disorganization and institutional
incompetence in its national security work, many of us in Congress have begun to
consider whether it might better serve the interests of the American people to separate
the counterintelligence and counterterrorism functions of the [FBI] into an entirely
separate organization—one that would be free of the structural, organizational, and
cultural constraints that have greatly handicapped the FBI’s ability to conduct the
domestic intelligence work our country depends upon it to perform.

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 98-99).
199

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 12).

200

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 129). A significant reason for this covert action
timidity, from Shelby’s perspective, was a history, during the Clinton Administration, of legal
authorizations contained in presidential Memoranda of Notifications (MONs) “as to what [covert] agents
are permitted to do in pursuit of the stated aim—with absolute clarity.” Id. (footnote citing Joint
Inquiry testimony of former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger).
201

Id.

202

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 13) (original emphasis).

203

Id. (original emphasis).

204

Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Mike Castle at 1).

205

Id.

206

Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Mike Castle at 1-2).
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207

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 2). Cf. Blomquist, supra note 180, at 91-2 (discussing
the concept of a collaborative versus an oppositional judicial dissenting opinion).
208

JOINT INQUIRY REPORT supra note 7 (additional views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 2).

209

Id. Senator DeWine’s suggestions for additional congressional oversight activities are incisive and
perspicacious. He proposes, for example:
[T]he Intelligence Committees [of Congress] should hold regularly scheduled hearings to
examine the FISA process and receive testimony from senior [executive branch] officials
…. These hearings should explore the FISA process and provide information as to how
FISA is being implemented. For example, in order to better determine how the
Executive Branch is utilizing FISA, the Committee should examine the number of FISA
warrants issued during a given period of time and the general subject matter or issues
those warrants were meant to address. Furthermore, these hearings should be used to
explore a wide range of hypothetical situations—situations based on actual cases that
demonstrate to [Congress] … how the law would be applied in certain scenarios. This
would allow [Congress] to develop a better understanding of how FISA is being
implemented in a practical, day-to-day manner and also alert [Congress] to any
instances where the [relevant intelligence entities are] departing from Congressional
intent.
Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 3).
210

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 4).

211

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 4, n. 2).

212

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 5).

213

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 6).

214

Id.

215

Id. An obvious potential problem with this particular idea, however, is securing the combined
intelligence database against computer hackers.
216

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 7).

217

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 8).

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Id.
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221

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 8-15). As explained by DeWine, this might include
attendance at a radical Islamic mosque in the U.S., allowing the American operative to travel abroad,
receiving training at a terrorist camp and to “infiltrate organizations like al Qaeda.” Id. (Additional
Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 14).
222

Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Jane Harman at 1).

223

Id.

224

Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Jane Harman at 2). In this regard, she went on to note that the “raw
databases” of many American intelligence agencies like the CIA and the NSA “contain extremely
valuable information that does not get noticed, shared, integrated, or acted upon.” Id.
225

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 1-4).

226

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 4).

227

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 20-1).

228

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 20-1).

229

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 1) (emphasis added).

230

Id.

231

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 1-2).

232

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 2).

233

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 2).

234

Id.

235

Id.

236

Id.

237

Id.

238

See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.

239

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Pat Roberts at 4).

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id.
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243

Id. (Additional View of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 4-5).

244

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 5-8) (discussing a “legacy of caution”
at key American intelligence agencies dealing with official concern about past congressional criticisms
of civil liberties violations and a cultural ethos that was afraid to make mistakes).
245

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 8-13) (discussing the “contradiction
between high-ranking officials’ complaints about inadequate resources and the fact that, according to
the Office Management and Budget, the intelligence agencies usually got what they asked for”).
246

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 13-15) (criticizing ambiguous legal
materials from presidential decision directives to the FISA statute).
247

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 15-17) (Among other things, noting that
“al Qaeda’s attack on Washington and New York occurred after a long period of poor leadership at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government regarding terrorism. Despite repeated assaults on the United
States and its interests—the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the bombing of the American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, to name a few—the U.S.
Government was still unwilling to treat terrorism as a true national security issue until 9/11”).
248

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 17-20) (criticizing the failure of the JIR
to fully discuss the failure of the U.S. State Department to deny visa access by 15 of the 19 hijackers
from Saudi Arabia).

249

Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 20) (internal quotation marks omitted).

250

Id.

251

Id.

252

For an excellent discussion of the constitutional and interactive problems of the congressional
oversight of the executive branch see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 203-10 (2000).
253

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.

254

Id. at art. I, § 8; art. I § 9.

255

David Nather, Congress As Watchdog: Asleep on the Job?, 62 CONG. QUART. WKLY 1190, 1190-93 (May
22, 2004). Prominent instances of past congressional oversight investigations include: the 1792 inquiry
on the Indian attacks on American troops—the first congressional oversight inquiry—by a select House
committee investigating the circumstances of an attack that killed about 600 U.S. troops commanded
by Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, id. at 1190; the first joint House-Senate investigative panel, conducted
from December 1861 through May 1865, that examined “past and future battle plans, disloyal
employees, navy installations, and war supplies and contracts” (considered “the worst-run
congressional inquiry until the McCarthy hearings of the 1950s”), id.; the Financial Trusts investigation
from February 1912 to February 1913 by a House Banking and Currency subcommittee looking into “the
concentration of money and credit, especially the control exercised by two New York banks,” with the
“panel’s report help[ing] [the] enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913” among other legislation;

84

id.; the investigations by the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Surveys and the Senate Select
Committee to Investigate the Justice Department, during 1923-24, into the “lease of naval oil reserves,
including one called Teapot Dome under a Wyoming rock formation by the Harding Administration”, id.
at 1190-91; the Defense Programs inquiry by the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National
Defense Program, during March 1941 to April 1948 (viewed as “the most effective congressional
investigation ever”) into “the status of national defenses to a more specific review of war mobilization
problems, shortages of critical materials such as aluminum, and fraud among contractors and
lobbyists”, id. at 1191; the Kefauver Crime Hearings, from May 1950 to Summer 1951, being the Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, which was “the first
congressional hearings to draw the rapt attention of television viewers across the nation as prominent
gangsters and underworld leaders were paraded in front of the panel”, id.; the McCarthy Investigations,
from January 1953 to December 1954, as the Senate Government Operations Committee’s Permanent
Investigations Committee conducted “a sweeping array of probes of purported communist subversion of
the U.S. government and the United Nations,” id. at 1191-92; the Watergate Hearings, during January
1973 to July 1974 of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and the House
Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry into President Richard M. Nixon’s illegal activities, id. at
1192; the Senate “Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities,” from January 1975 to April 1976, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), focusing on
the CIA’s domestic spying activities during the Vietnam War and leading to the formation of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, id. at 1192-93; and the Iran Contra hearings, from November 1986 to
August 1987, before the jointly-convened House and Senate Intelligence Committees, id. at 1193.
256

Id. at 1191.

257

Id. at 1191-94.

258

Id. at 1193.

259

Id.

260

Christopher Marquis, Reports On Attacks Are Gripping, Not Dry, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, at A23.

261

See Helen Fessenden, Intelligence Panels’ Mission Corroded by Air of Distrust, 62 CONG. QUART.
WKLY. 730 (Mar. 27, 2004).
262

Id. at 733.

263

Editorial, Wake Up the Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A26.

264

Id. See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21 (recommending consolidation of
congressional oversight over counterterrorism and fostering expertise of specific members of Congress).
265

Editorial, supra note 263, at A26.

266

Id.

267

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

268

Id. See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21.
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269

See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text; see infra note 304.

270

Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1062 (2004).

271

Cf. id. at 1021-53 (discussing the details of institutional breakdown in public schools, mental health
facilities, prisons, police departments and housing authorities).
272

See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1-4 (tenth ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994)
(theorizing that human conflict, in the satisfaction of human wants is an inescapable feature of human
interdependence and in resolving this inherent and systemic conflict “affirmative and knowledgeable
cooperation” through law is necessary. Moreover, Hart and Sacks recognized that as part of their
fundamental interdependence with others, “people form themselves into groups for the protection and
advancement of their common interests”; so, too, individuals establish “[t]he [i]nstitutionalization of
[p]rocedures for the [s]ettlement of [q]uestions of [g]roup [c]oncern”).
273

Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

274

Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation
of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113 (2003).

275

Id. at 2125, n. 50 (original emphasis) (internal quotation marks omitted).

276

Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1053.

277

Id.

278

Id.

279

Id. at 1067. For a general theoretical discussion of the challenges and tools available for the
conscientious American legislator see Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal
Process Perspectives and Possibilities, 30 AKRON L. REV. (2005) (forthcoming).
280

Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1067.

281

Id. at 1068.

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

Id.

285

Id.

286

Id. at 1069 (footnote omitted).
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287

Id.

288

Id.

289

Id.

290

Id.

291

Id. at 1070.

292

Id.

293

Id. at 1071.

294

Id. According to Professors Sabel and Simon:
[W]hatever the technical legal status of the plans, their function is not so
much to coerce obedience as to introduce internal deliberation and external
transparency. Forcing the [stakeholders] … to agree on a clear description of
their practices puts pressure on them to reflect on and explain what they are
doing. Moreover, the practice norms enable outsiders to determine what the
practitioners are up to. They complement the performance norms by
describing the inputs that generate the outputs indicated by those norms.

Id. (footnote omitted).
295

Id.

296

Id.

297

Id. at 1072.

298

Id.

299

As an excellent model for private sector input into sensitive national security matters see NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS NIC
2000-02 (December 2000) (discussing, among other “drivers and trends” the development of
“transnational terrorism” and possible American responses).
300

Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1072.

301

Id.

302

Id. at 1073.

303

Id.

304

The danger of these proposed reforms is that they will end up being more process than real
congressional oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policy. Cf. Orde F. Kittrie, More Process

87

Than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords (Book Review Essay), 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661,
1663 (2003) (the reliance of the drafters of the Oslo Accords relied to an excessive degree “on openended gradualism and ambiguity in their efforts to turn peace negotiations into a legally binding, final
settlement” which “reliance proved to be disastrously counterproductive”). For the rather tepid
suggestions by the 9/11 Commission to improve congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland
security see THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 156, at 419-21.
For interesting recent articles discussing the constitutional dimensions of the post-9/11 terrorism
environment—beyond the scope of this Article—see e.g. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
For an account of congressional bills to incorporate the 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT’s recommendations into
legislation see Philip Shenon, Bipartisan Bill Offered on 9/11 Panel’s Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2004, at A1. See also Editorial, Duty Chafes on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at A26 (“The
bipartisan Report’s parallel warning that Congress must reform itself to apply true intelligence
oversight is flat-lining so far on Capitol Hill as rival committee leaders defend a checkerboard full of
important fiefs.”)
Congress—in late 2004—with prodding by President Bush, ended up passing legislation that encapsulated
many of the 9/11 Commission recommendations—some of which had also been suggested by the
congressional Joint Inquiry. Perhaps the most significant change in the intelligence law reforms was
the creation of the position of National Intelligence Director. See Intelligence, 63 CONG. QUART. WKLY.
24 (Jan. 3, 2005) (“The first homeland security question to be resolved is whether the House will create
a more powerful committee to oversee [intelligence] or continue to fragment oversight among dozens
of panels”; “Congress passed the intelligence overhaul bill, but now the Intelligence and Homeland
Security committees will have to deal with what they wrought, overseeing yet another major
government reorganization.”)
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